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Property’s End: Why Competition Policy Should
Limit the Right of Publicity
STEVEN SEMERARO
The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that empowers
celebrities to prohibit unauthorized uses of their names, images, and
identities. Since its inception a half-century ago, the right has been an
enigma. Publicity rights, critics argue, are unnecessary to stimulate the
pursuit of fame, unneeded to manage the value of publicity, and
undeserved in any recognized moral sense. Yet, to the amazement of some,
and the consternation of many, this ostensibly persuasive critique has had
little practical impact on lawmakers.
This Article proposes that competition policy should delineate the
scope of the right of publicity. Some judges and legal commentators write
as if the limits of property are set independently of other social interests.
The value of competition, they say, plays no direct role in defining the
scope of property rights. Through a careful review of case and statutory
law, this Article shows that this view is mistaken. In fact, competition
policy plays a critical role in defining property’s end, limiting the scope of
all recognized property rights when those rights enable owners to stifle
meaningful competition. The antitrust laws and competition-based
regulatory programs have repeatedly required owners to share or sell all
forms of property in order to ensure that consumers receive the benefits of
competition. Applying this insight to the right of publicity would enable
courts to narrow the scope of publicity rights whenever a celebrity’s
exercise of that right would restrain competition. This approach would
curb the worst abuses in the publicity rights cases without casting doubt on
the legitimacy of other property rights.
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Property’s End: Why Competition Policy Should
Limit the Right of Publicity
STEVEN SEMERARO*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that empowers
celebrities to prohibit unauthorized uses of their names, images, and
identities.1 Since its inception a half-century ago, the right has been an
enigma. Its critics argue that “no one seems to be able to explain exactly
why individuals should have this right.”2 Publicity rights are unnecessary
to stimulate the pursuit of fame,3 unneeded to manage the value of
publicity,4 and undeserved in any recognized moral sense.5 Yet, to the
amazement of some, and the consternation of many, this ostensibly
persuasive critique has had little practical impact on lawmakers. K.J.
Greene summed up the current state of affairs pithily: “The right of
publicity . . . has a lot of analytical problems and yet, . . . [it] has expanded

* Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author thanks Shubha Ghosh, Kevin
Jerome Greene, Abigail Kite, Mark Lemley, and Eric Mitnick for comments on earlier drafts, and
Carmela Hodgers, James Mullen, and Jay Temple for their research assistance.
1
The right of publicity is a property right prohibiting the appropriation of “the commercial value
of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity
for purposes of trade.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); see also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (prohibiting “us[ing] another’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services”). The right is generally
thought to be limited to “commercial” uses. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY § 3:2 (West 2d ed. 2005) (explaining that “what is required is proof that the defendant
intended to obtain a commercial advantage”). Some states, though, extend it to any advantageous use.
See, e.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994); White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining the right as applying to “appropriation of
plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise” (quoting Eastwood
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983))), amended by No. 90-55840, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992).
2
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity]; see also
id. at 1190 (concluding that “a reasonable and persuasive justification for the right of publicity [is]
sorely lacking”); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993) (arguing that the right of publicity was adopted “without a
systematic, theoretically persuasive case ever having been made for recognition of an independent
property-like right of publicity”).
3
See infra Part III.A.1.
4
See infra Part III.B.2.
5
See infra Parts IV.A.1, B.1.
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faster than Steven Segal’s waistline in recent years.”
This Article has two goals. First, it explains why the seemingly
powerful prevailing critique of publicity rights has failed to influence
courts and legislatures. The right’s critics claim that publicity cannot be
property because the arguments used to justify actual property simply do
not apply to publicity.7 So far, so good. But when one looks closely at any
form of property—real or personal, patent or copyright—the standard
justifications break down. As a result, each quiver in the right-of-publicity
critic’s arsenal turns out to be just as fatal when aimed at every other form
of property.8 This part of the Article reveals the critique’s overbreadth and
postulates that lawmakers are reluctant to substantially restrict the right of
publicity on grounds that would also compel fundamental changes to all
property rights.9
6

K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and Right of Publicity, 11
CHAP. L. REV. 521, 521 (2008). In 2005, right-of-publicity critic Mark McKenna wrote that the right
“has expanded to allow claims against an ever-increasing range of conduct. . . . And there is no end to
that trend in sight; one can discern no principle in the current doctrine or its dominant theory on which
any limitation might be based.” Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous SelfDefinition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 226 (2005) (footnote omitted); id. at 226 & n.6 (citing “a long line
of (often successful) attempts by celebrities to extend the claim’s boundaries”); see also Sheldon W.
Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value
of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 869 (1995) (citing wide academic support for the right of
publicity); Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 301 (2004)
(explaining that the right of publicity “is now utilized more than ever before”).
7
See infra Part III.
8
In his seminal critique of the right of publicity, Michael Madow acknowledged that many of his
arguments could be applied to property rights generally. See Madow, supra note 2, at 183–84 (“[I]t is
by no means evident that anyone—carpenter or celebrity—has a natural or moral right to the full
market value of the product of her labor.”); id. at 196 (“Just as the carpenter does not start from scratch
in building a chair, but instead draws upon a pre-existing body of techniques, tools, and craft
knowledge, so it is with artists, musicians, actors, and even athletes.”); id. at 205 & n.384 (citing prior
work critiquing the economic arguments in favor of all forms of private property); id. at 212 & nn.412–
13 (recognizing prior work showing that the incentive effect of weakening property rights is
theoretically uncertain); id. at 220 & n.442 (recognizing that private property is not necessary to
allocate resources efficiently because any central manager could prevent wasteful use, and non-legal
social factors operate to discourage waste). Madow’s followers have made a greater effort to
distinguish the right of publicity from other forms of property. See Dogan & Lemley, Right of
Publicity, supra note 2, at 1188 (“Unlike copyright law—which aims to promote the production of
valuable works of authorship that enhance the quality of discourse and understanding in our society—
the right of publicity . . . does not encourage the production of any identifiable value . . . .”).
9
One might, of course, argue that all forms of property are invalid. Understandably, the critics
have not done that. Instead, most have simply ignored the issue of whether publicity rights are similar
to other property rights. Those who have considered the question, however, generally acknowledge an
intuitive, yet unarticulated, sense that publicity rights are valid property rights. For example, Alice
Haemmerli, who has attempted to justify the right on moral grounds, has asserted that a right of
publicity “resonates fairly strongly with our cultural mores.” Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case
for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 413 (1999); see also id. at 390 (arguing that “the
Kantian emphasis on inherent human value resonates strongly with our political culture”); id. at 404
(observing that “compensation- and commodification-based objections to the right of publicity appear
to be emotional, rather than analytical”); id. at 488 (maintaining that beliefs in personal autonomy and
private property underlie our culture). Similarly, Eugene Volokh, who generally shares the critics’
concerns with the right of publicity, has recognized that “[t]he notion that my name and likeness are my
property seems to make sense.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
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Second, this Article considers theories that would more effectively
limit the right of publicity. It first explores the argument that free speech
interests should limit publicity rights.10 This approach is doomed to fail
because, as many commentators have explained, courts cannot balance the
social value of particular forms of speech against publicity rights because
the value of publicity is so poorly articulated.11 Even more fundamentally,
the concept of balancing free speech and property interests is incoherent.
Individuals have no right to use another’s property to speak.12 Any attempt
to limit the scope of the right of publicity through the prism of the First
Amendment will thus beg the question whether publicity is property. If it
is, then any restraint on speech should be neither surprising nor
problematic.13 If it is not, then any restraint on speech would be
unacceptable. Attempting to balance speech and publicity simply restates
the underlying question—whether publicity rights are property—without
providing any means to answer it.
This Article proposes that competition policy should delineate the
HOUS. L. REV. 903, 929 (2003). After acknowledging that one may “question[] whether the right of
publicity truly serves any social purpose,” the California Supreme Court nevertheless concluded “that
the Legislature has a rational basis for permitting celebrities . . . to control the commercial exploitation
of the celebrity’s likeness.” Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal.
2001). California law is not atypical in defining “‘property [a]s sufficiently comprehensive to include
every species of estate, real and personal, and everything which one person can own and transfer to
another. It extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which
it is practicable to place a money value.’” Yuba River Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128,
129 (Cal. 1929) (quoting 22 R.C.L. 43 § 10 (1929)). Since the “‘name, voice and likeness’” of a
celebrity has transferable value in this sense, Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 213 F.2d 662, 665–66
(9th Cir. 1954), treating publicity as property does not seem jarring to the sensibilities of most
Americans.
Others have also identified a natural law basis for the right of publicity. 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 2:1; cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 151, 152–53 [hereinafter Kwall, Preserving Personality] (noting parallels between moral rights
and the right of publicity).
10
See infra Part V.A.
11
See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1162–63 (“[B]ecause the right
of publicity rests upon a slew of sometimes sloppy rationalizations, courts have little way of
determining whether a particular speech limitation is necessary or even appropriate in order to serve the
law’s normative goals. Instead, they appear to assume that the sum of a set of inadequate justifications
equals far more than its parts and allow right of publicity claims to run roughshod over the speech
interests of the public.” (footnote omitted)).
12
For instance, homeowners may prohibit speakers from invading their property rights against
their will. See infra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
13
Right-of-publicity critics would surely object on the ground that publicity simply is not
property. That fundamental question, however, is beyond the scope of this Article, and indeed their
critique as well. As Parts III and IV show, virtually every aspect of the prevailing critique would apply
to every form of property. Although the critique demonstrates powerfully that the right of publicity
cannot be justified on the traditional grounds used to justify other forms of property, it fails to grapple
with the reality that other forms of property also cannot be justified on those traditional grounds. This
Article does not take a position on whether publicity rights are true property. Rather, it pragmatically
accepts that courts have treated publicity as property for fifty years and seeks a means of regulating the
scope of these rights within that paradigm.
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scope of the right of publicity. Some judges and legal commentators
write as if the limits of property are set independently of other social
interests.15 The value of competition, they say, plays no direct role in
defining the scope of property rights.16 Through a careful review of case
and statutory law, however, this Article shows that this view is mistaken.17
In fact, competition policy plays a critical role in defining property’s end,
limiting the scope of all recognized property rights when those rights
enable owners to stifle meaningful competition. The antitrust laws and
competition-based regulatory programs have repeatedly required owners to
share or sell all forms of property in order to ensure that consumers receive
the benefits of competition.18 Applying this insight to the right of publicity
would enable courts to narrow the scope of publicity rights whenever a
celebrity’s exercise of that right would restrain competition. This approach
would curb the worst abuses in the publicity rights cases without casting
doubt on the legitimacy of other property rights.19
Part II introduces the right of publicity and shows that its supporters
rely on the standard arguments that have been thought to validate all forms
of property. Parts III and IV explore the prevailing critique, which posits
that these standard justifications simply do not apply to publicity rights,
and explain that this critique is humbled only by its breadth. The very
analysis purporting to show that publicity rights are unjustified unwittingly
demonstrates that for the same reasons all property is unjustifiable. If
accepted, the critics’ analysis would logically compel both courts and
legislatures to reexamine all recognized forms of property. Unless one is
willing to restructure American property law from top to bottom, the
prevailing critique of the right of publicity will never gain traction.
Part V pragmatically accepts (without condoning) that the right of
publicity is a valid property right, and explores whether free speech
14
The choice of the term “competition policy” rather than “antitrust” is deliberate. Competition
policy is used herein to denote the full spectrum of public rules promoting marketplace competition,
including, but not limited to, the antitrust laws. For a recent articulation of the concept, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 103, 104 (2008). In
short, some practices conflict with recognized competition-policy goals even though they do not violate
the specific provisions of antitrust law.
15
In a 2001 speech, Mary Azcuenaga, a former FTC Commissioner, articulated this common
view: “[Y]ou could actually know everything you need to know about antitrust and intellectual
property by remembering” that if the IP-holder did not “somehow expand[] the scope of the intellectual
property right . . . and if the intellectual property was properly obtained, then there should be no need to
apply antitrust law.” Mary L. Azcuenaga, Address, Recent Issues in Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 11 (2001).
16
See infra Part VI.C.3.
17
See infra Part IV.B.2. Recent commentary articulates an economic justification as well for the
use of competition policy to limit property rights. See Howard A. Shelanski, Unilateral Refusals To
Deal in Intellectual and Other Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 379–86 (2009) (discussing economic
considerations underlying the use of competition policy to limit property rights).
18
Shelanski, supra note 17, at 379–86.
19
See infra Part V.B.
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principles could be used to limit the right’s scope. It concludes that the
concept of balancing speech and publicity cannot coherently limit the right
of publicity.
Part VI presents the Article’s main normative thesis: competition
policy provides a valid ground on which to distinguish the right of
publicity from other forms of property when a celebrity’s exercise of the
right of publicity would restrain competition. Since competition policy is a
vital component in defining the limit of all forms of property, using it to
restrain the scope of publicity rights would not disrupt any other branch of
property law. This Part also explains how the competition policy model
would (1) call for a different outcome in some of the most criticized
publicity rights cases, and (2) more effectively justify the decisions in areas
that have been relatively uncontroversial in outcome but difficult to justify
in principle, such as advertising, news reporting, and biography.
II. THE TROUBLED YET RESILIENT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
This Part briefly reviews the history of the right of publicity, showing
that the arguments advanced to justify the right are the same ones that have
been used to justify all forms of property.
A. Origins of the Right of Publicity
In response to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s call for a right to
privacy,20 courts gradually started protecting individuals against the
embarrassing or false use of their name or picture.21 This right extended to
both celebrities and private persons, but celebrities had a difficult time
showing harm from mere publication because they generally sought
publicity.22 Furthermore, if a celebrity did prove mental anguish, damages
were limited to redress for that harm rather than for the expropriated
commercial value of the celebrity’s name or likeness.23
In the 1953 case Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.,24 the Second Circuit first explicitly recognized a distinct property
right in publicity.25 The trial court rejected a trading card manufacturer’s
claim that it had acquired the exclusive right to publish pictures of a
20
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195–96,
205 (1890). Warren and Brandeis were careful to advocate for tort remedies and to avoid suggesting
that courts create a new property right. Id. at 198, 205, 219–20. Their approach, however, was
influenced by the notion that individuals had a right to control the use of their personality just as the
creator of tangible or intangible property obtained rights over the creation. Id. at 206–07.
21
For an excellent summary of the development of privacy law, see Dogan & Lemley, Right of
Publicity, supra note 2, at 1167–71.
22
Id. at 1171.
23
Id.
24
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
25
Id. at 868.
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26

ballplayer. The lower court held that the right of privacy protected the
player against embarrassment, but that personal rights could not be
transferred.27 Under then-existing law, a celebrity could not maximize the
value of his or her persona through licensing arrangements that permitted
one advertiser to sue another for improperly using the celebrity’s name or
likeness.28 The Second Circuit disagreed, reversing the lower court’s
decision and recognizing a new enforceable property right in publicity.29
“[I]n addition to and independent of th[e] right of privacy,” Judge Jerome
Frank wrote, “a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph,
i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture.”30
Almost immediately, commentators began to articulate theoretical
justifications for this new right, and additional courts and legislatures
adopted it.
B. Theoretical Justifications for the Right of Publicity
In 1954, Melville Nimmer published an academic defense of the right
of publicity.31 From a moral perspective, he argued that a valuable
persona, like other forms of property, could be created “only after [an
individual] has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even
money.”32 Nimmer emphasized that within the Anglo-American legal
tradition, “every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors.”33
Like any property interest, Nimmer believed that the right of publicity
has limits. Individuals are thought to deserve their creations, he wrote,
“unless there are important countervailing public policy considerations.”34
Where a person’s name or likeness is used to report “news or in a manner
required by the public interest,” Nimmer argued, “that person should not
be able to complain of the infringement of his right of publicity.”35
In ensuing decades, judges and commentators sought to justify the
right of publicity through instrumental claims that had been advanced to
explain other types of property.36 Some courts have found that the right
26

Id. at 867.
Id. at 867–68. For cases recognizing these limits on the right to privacy, see Hanna
Manufacturing Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1935); Von Thodorovich v.
Franz Josef Beneficial Ass’n, 154 F. 911, 912 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907).
28
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867.
29
See id. at 868 (expressing some reluctance to attach the “‘property’ right” label, though
recognizing that any enforceable right is in fact property).
30
Id.
31
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 222–23 (1954).
32
Id. at 216.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 216–17.
36
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30–31 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining that
private property rights provide (1) incentives to use resources efficiently, and (2) a means to efficiently
allocate the use of scarce resources).
27
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provides incentives to create a valuable persona, just as private property
rights also provide incentives to work and innovate.37 Society is better off,
the argument runs, because one cannot personally capture the entire
surplus from productive work and innovation; the spillover necessarily
benefits the public.38
Richard Posner and other scholars have stressed that the right of
publicity enables proper management of the value of celebrity to protect
against wasteful dissipation through overuse.39 This theory assumes that
producing too many low-value works crowds out more valuable ones. For
example, Tom Waits, a popular singer, uses a very distinctive vocal style.
If advertisers could copy that style at will, the public would grow tired of
it, lessening the value of Waits’s own performances.40
Recently, scholars have offered an alternative moral justification,
grounding the right of publicity in theories of autonomy and personality.41
37
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804–05 (Cal. 2001) (noting that
“‘[y]ears of labor may be required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently
developed to permit an economic return through some medium of commercial promotion’” (quoting
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting))).
38
As Richard Posner has explained:
The individual may be completely selfish but he cannot, in a well-regulated market
economy, promote his self-interest without benefiting others as well as himself.
Since . . . the social product of the productive individual in a market economy will
exceed his earnings, such an individual cannot help creating more wealth than he
takes out of society.
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 132 (1979).
39
See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 97, 103–04, 126 (1994) (arguing that a right of publicity is necessary to coordinate a market for a
celebrity’s name and to prevent rapid dissipation of the value of publicity assets through overuse);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
485 (2003) (claiming that a justification for the right of publicity, and for characterizing it as
inheritable, is that it prevents “the premature exhaustion of the commercial value of the celebrity’s
name or likeness”); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634 (2003)
[hereinafter Posner, Misappropriation] (“The rationale of the right of publicity cases lies . . . in the
danger of a congestion externality if there is no control over the use of the celebrity’s name or likeness
in advertising and other commercial uses.”); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV.
393, 411 (1978) [hereinafter Posner, Right of Privacy] (“There is a perfectly good economic reason for
assigning the property right in a photograph used for advertising purposes to the photographed
individual: this assignment assures that the advertiser to whom the photograph is most valuable will
purchase it. Making the photograph the communal property of advertisers would not achieve this
goal. . . . Furthermore, the multiple use of the identical photograph to advertise different products
would reduce its advertising value, perhaps to zero.”); see also Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256,
257, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (explaining that the defendant’s conduct, which consisted of running a product
commercial featuring a cartoon duck voiced by an actor who specialized in imitating the plaintiff’s
voice, without the plaintiff’s consent, “saturated [the] plaintiff’s audience to the point of curtailing his
market”).
40
Grady, supra note 39, at 101–02; see also Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110–11
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting that there was evidence of consumer confusion as to whether Waits sang an
endorsement for a Frito-Lay product, and that there was a “likelihood that the wrongful use of his
professional trademark, his unique voice, would injure him commercially”).
41
Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 418; Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1532, 1541–42. Others have advanced less fully-developed arguments that the right should
rest on something akin to autonomy rights. In his treatise on privacy and publicity, McCarthy has
stated that “the law today would be more coherent . . . if it had developed such that courts would
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Alice Haemmerli has argued that individuals have a property right in the
use of their “objectified identity.”42 If society recognizes identity as
something that can be bought and sold, autonomy and personality interests
favor permitting “the person who is its natural source” to claim that
value43—not because they deserve it, but because humans have an innate
right to their own identity and persona.44 As Roberta Kwall has
emphasized, the primary concern of the law under this view is not
economics but “damage to the human spirit.”45 Just as certain examples of
personal property (such as a wedding ring) or real property (such as a
family home) are important to particular individuals, one’s image or style
may be critical to autonomous self-development.46
Shubha Ghosh has connected these two justifications, concluding that
the right of publicity protects against both (1) appropriating a celebrity’s
personality for commercial purposes by revealing “the private person” to
the public without consent, and (2) usurping a public person’s investment
in an income-generating persona.47 Ghosh describes these two goals as
complements that “together permit the self-regulation of one’s identity” by
granting rights in publicity to those who want to withhold their persona
from public view for all or some purposes, and to persons who seek a
return on the value of their identity.48
C. Current Law
A half-century after Judge Frank’s opinion in Topps, at least twentyfour states have recognized the right of publicity either by statute or

recognize a sui generis legal right labeled something like a ‘right of identity’ with damages measured
by both mental distress and commercial loss.” 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:40; see also Oliver R.
Goodenough, Go Fish: Evaluating the Restatement’s Formulation of the Law of Publicity, 47 S.C. L.
REV. 709, 736, 766–67 (1996) (describing McCarthy’s observations on the development of the right of
publicity); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (“The moral right doctrine generally is said to encompass
three major components: the right of disclosure, the right of paternity, and the right of integrity. Some
formulations of the moral right doctrine also include the right of withdrawal, the right to prevent
excessive criticism, and the right to prevent assaults upon one’s personality.”); Kwall, Preserving
Personality, supra note 9, at 158, 166 (explaining that “[t]he essence of a moral-rights injury lies in the
damage caused to the author’s personality,” and proposing a moral-rights safeguard against “damage to
the human spirit”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A
Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 70 (1994) [hereinafter Kwall, Right of Publicity]
(“[C]onfusion might be avoided if the right of publicity were explicitly acknowledged to include
emotional as well as economic harms.”).
42
Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 418.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 418, 420–21, 427–28.
45
Kwall, Preserving Personality, supra note 9, at 166.
46
Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 423–25.
47
Shubha Ghosh, On Bobbling Heads, Paparazzi, and Justice Hugo Black, 45 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 617, 619 (2005) [hereinafter Ghosh, Bobbling Heads].
48
Id. at 619–20.
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49

through common law.
The right has also been incorporated into the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition50 and recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court.51 Although state laws vary,52 most recognize a broad right
of publicity that is tempered by concern about free speech interests.53
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Commentators have presented thorough and persuasive critiques of
both the incentive and the efficient management justifications for the right
of publicity.54 Although these critics cast doubt on the wisdom of
recognizing a right of publicity based on these instrumental goals, each
prong of the critique can be applied with roughly equal vigor to any form
of property. This overbreadth limits the effectiveness of the critique
because a court or legislature adopting it would be logically required to
question all types of property rights.
49
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 6:3; see also James A. Johnson, Personal Images: The
Professional Athlete’s Right of Publicity, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 11, 12, 19 n.10 (2008)
(noting that eighteen states have publicity statutes and that at least six other states have recognized a
common law right of publicity). The following state statutes articulate a right of publicity: CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2007); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
1075/30 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (LexisNexis 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
391.170 (West 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 214, § 3 (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201–
11, 25-840.01 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597.770–.810 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2009); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 397 (McKinney 1996); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2741.04 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1448–49 (West 1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1–.3 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-251101–08 (2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001–.015 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1–2
(LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
63.60.030–.060 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2006). Only twelve states have not
recognized a right of publicity. See Johnson, supra, at 12, 19 n.11 (listing Alaska, Arizona, Idaho,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina,
Vermont, and Wyoming).
50
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
51
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977).
52
Elaborate summaries of the various tests, and sometimes outlandish results, across different
jurisdictions have been presented exhaustively by others and will not be repeated here. See, e.g.,
Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1167–80 (discussing the development of the right
of publicity and the varying conceptions of this right across different jurisdictions); Volokh, supra note
9, at 904 (arguing that the right of publicity, while often analyzed under First Amendment commercial
speech doctrine, would be better analyzed by dividing speech into distinct categories).
53
See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that free speech interests curb state law rights of publicity);
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a celebrity’s right of
publicity must yield to First Amendment interests where an author’s work “contain[s] significant
transformative elements which make it especially worthy of First Amendment protection”); Newton v.
Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the requirements of a right-ofpublicity claim under California law); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th
Cir. 1992) (defining the right as applying to “‘the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise’” (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 417 (Ct. App. 1983))).
54
See infra Parts III.A.1, B.1.
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A. Critiquing the Incentive-Based Justification of the Right of Publicity
By rewarding hard work with a property right, individuals are
presumed to be more productive and creative than they otherwise would
be, thus benefiting society.55 Advocates of a strong right of publicity
contend that, just as property rights generally incentivize productive labor,
the right of publicity serves the same function with respect to celebrity.56
The critics of publicity rights have argued forcefully and persuasively to
the contrary. Their reasoning casts significant doubt on this justification’s
applicability—not only to the right of publicity, but to every recognized
form of private property.
1. Incentives To Generate Publicity Are Unnecessary and Harmful
Right-of-publicity advocates believe that property rights in publicity
incentivize individuals to create performances or works of art that enhance
their own celebrity while benefiting society, aesthetically and perhaps
economically as well. “[P]roviding legal protection for the economic value
in one’s identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation,” the late
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird wrote, “enrich[es] our
society” by providing “a powerful incentive for expending time and
resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public
recognition.”57
In his take-no-prisoners polemic, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,58 Michael Madow challenged this
55
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68 (Richard Hildreth trans., Oceana Publ’ns,
Inc. 1975) (1789).
56
See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–77 (“Ohio has recognized what may be the strongest case
for a ‘right of publicity’—involving . . . the appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer
acquired his reputation in the first place.”); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (arguing that “[v]indication of the right [of publicity] will tend to encourage
achievement in Carson’s chosen field”); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 287 (2d Cir.
1981) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “the public policy of providing incentives for
individual enterprise and investment of capital and energy argues for allowing an individual to pass the
fruits of his labors along to others after his death”); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441
(Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “providing legal protection for the economic value in
one’s identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful incentive for expending
time and resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public recognition”); Peter L.
Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life
After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1980) (“The social policy underlying the right of publicity is
encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity by allowing people to profit from their own
efforts.”); Steven J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 111,
118 (1980) (“Like the copyright and patent regimes, the right of publicity may foster the production of
intellectual and creative works by providing the financial incentive for individuals to expend the time
and resources necessary to produce them.”).
57
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
58
Madow, supra note 2. Although many commentators have criticized the right of publicity after
Madow, their reasoning has not strayed significantly from his original approach. See Peles, supra note
6, at 309 (noting “the difficulty in finding a balance between the First Amendment and the right of
publicity”); Volokh, supra note 9, at 905 (noting that “many lower courts have held that the First
Amendment precludes right of publicity liability in many cases”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting
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view on three grounds. First, he argued that incentives generated by the
right of publicity are unnecessary because its rewards are merely a
collateral source of income for celebrities who already make outstanding
livings from their primary professions.59 The high earnings of successful
celebrities, Madow wrote, “suggest that even without the right of publicity
the rate of return to stardom in the entertainment and sports fields is
probably high enough to bring forth a more than ‘adequate’ supply of
creative effort and achievement.”60 Judge Richard Posner agrees with
Madow, adding that denying a celebrity the right “to appropriate the entire
income from the franchising of his name and likeness . . . [would permit]
free riding but not the type that threatens to kill the goose that lays the
golden eggs, . . . it is free riding merely on ancillary products.”61
Celebrities, these commentators believe, will not cut back significantly on
their productive work if publicity rights are restricted.
Second, Madow argued that the effect of limiting returns to publicity
could actually increase a celebrity’s incentive to produce more of the
primary goods and services from which the fame arose.62 This would be
especially likely if a celebrity wished to maintain a particular income level
and could not rely on endorsement income. If returns to publicity were
reduced or eliminated, the celebrity would have to work harder in her
primary endeavor in order to achieve the desired income level.63
Third, Madow claimed that society would actually gain by reducing
incentives to seek celebrity.64 Currently, the right of publicity inefficiently
encourages individuals to waste resources in taking a very long shot at
fame. The potential returns, even without a publicity right, are already so
high—and the possibility of achieving them so likely to be
Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too
Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL’Y 283, 307 (2000) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Fitting
Publicity Rights] (criticizing several justifications for publicity rights). Compare Madow, supra note 2,
at 136 (asserting that “[c]ontemporary proponents of the right of publicity have, in the main, exhibited
surprisingly little interest in the basic question of justification”), with Dogan & Lemley, Right of
Publicity, supra note 2, at 1163 (“[A] review of the cases and literature reveals that no one seems to be
able to explain exactly why individuals should have this right.”).
59
At least one court has employed this analysis in denying a right-of-publicity claim. See ETW
Corp. v. Jireh, 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that a particular celebrity earned substantial
income from his profession, which was unrelated to his right of publicity).
60
Madow, supra note 2, at 210; see also Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at
1187–88 (suggesting that analogies to copyright law do not support the right of publicity); McKenna,
supra note 6, at 258–63 (arguing that “instrumental labor theory” does not support a property right in
one’s identity); Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights, supra note 58, at 307 (“[L]ots of people who
generate publicity values have gotten on quite nicely without collecting a cent from them.”).
61
Posner, Misappropriation, supra note 39, at 634.
62
Madow, supra note 2, at 209–10.
63
Id. at 211–12.
64
See id. at 216 (“Is it not at least possible that society would be better off if some of the kids who
are not devoting themselves to perfecting their jumpshots (or guitar riffs) in the usually vain hope of
making it to the NBA (or the top of the charts) said ‘to hell with it,’ and started thinking of other ways
of making a living?”).
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overestimated—that the law would better serve social interests by reducing
incentives to pursue fame.65
2. Extending the Incentive Critique to Other Forms of Property
Madow’s critique applies to all forms of property, and thus if publicity
rights cannot be justified on incentive grounds then neither can any other
form of property.66 Madow’s critique thus faces a formidable countercritique: why should publicity lose its status as a property right when other
forms of property have the same shortcoming?
a. The Effect of Incentives Across Property Types
Dogan and Lemley have made the strongest case that the pursuit of
celebrity (and thus publicity) is fundamentally different from the pursuit of
other forms of property. They contend that the monetary rewards made
possible by most property rights—such as productive labor, useful
inventions, and works of art—benefit society by inspiring individuals to
create more wealth than they otherwise would.67 By contrast, publicity
rights “do[] not encourage the production of any identifiable value.”68
Quoting Diane Zimmerman, Dogan and Lemley argue that one can find no
evidence that celebrities would “‘invest less energy and talent’ in
becoming famous without a publicity right.”69
This reasoning begs the question, what evidence establishes that
individuals would work less, and create fewer inventions and works of art,
if they were denied the incentives that existing property rights provide? In
the same article in which Zimmerman concluded that the right of publicity
was not needed to encourage the pursuit of fame, she also expressed doubt
65
Id. at 216–19; Volokh, supra note 9, at 910–11; see also Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity,
supra note 2, at 1164 (“Society doesn’t need to encourage more celebrities or more marketing of
celebrity image.”).
66
Empirical distinctions among types of property may exist, but the right-of-publicity critics fail
to cite the data—or even suggest the type of data—that would be necessary to evaluate the differing
effects of incentives on particular property rights.
67
See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1188 (“Unlike copyright law—which
aims to promote the production of valuable works of authorship that enhance the quality of discourse
and understanding in our society—the right of publicity rewards those who, with luck, hard work, or
accident of birth, happen to join the ranks of the famous.”).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1187 (quoting Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights, supra note 58, at 306); see also
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 43–
44 (2004) (arguing that “the right of publicity is not necessary to promote development”); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?
Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 144 (1996)
(“As a general matter, the right of publicity does not fit the utilitarian mold because the costs of
creating a persona are recaptured through the activity with which the purveyor is primarily
associated.”); Posner, Misappropriation, supra note 39, at 634 (reasoning that “[a] person is unlikely to
invest less than he would otherwise do in becoming a movie star or other type of celebrity merely
because he’ll be unable to appropriate the entire income from the franchising of his name and
likeness”).
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about the value of copyright. “Creative writers and scholars,” she
recognized, “may be driven by internal needs to express their ideas or by
the hope of fame or esteem in their fields.”70 As a result, she concluded
that “the actual effect on the level of production that results from the
presence or absence of any particular protection . . . is highly
speculative.”71 The instrumental incentive argument thus fails to support
copyright in virtually the same way that it fails to support the right of
publicity.72
K.J. Greene has supported Zimmerman’s hypothesis with a particularly
powerful example: African-American musicians operating without creative
incentives produced some of the most entertaining and lasting music of the
twentieth century.73 Greene contends that all of intellectual property has
seen unjustified expansion in scope and power.74 Quoting Deborah
Tussey, he argues that “[t]here has been little, if any, ‘systematic study of
the effects of such [intellectual property rights] on the hundreds of [IP]
industries that they are designed to encourage.’”75
A similar argument applies to other property. Individuals vigorously
pursue all forms of property for reasons of love, honor, respect, personal
satisfaction, and subsistence in addition to the returns on their
investment.76 The desires to succeed in one’s career, live in a comfortable
house, and possess nice things are all complex desires that are only
partially explained by the desire to acquire property. Even if the legal
70
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 706 (1992) [hereinafter
Zimmerman, Information as Speech].
71
Id. at 706–07; see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 22 (1987) (“To
take a ready analogy from the copyright field, only a charlatan would claim to know how much more
literary production we would get if novelists had to be paid by parodists of their work, or how much
parody we would lose, or how to evaluate these gains and losses objectively.”).
72
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, supra note 70, at 704–07; see also Michael A. Carrier,
The Propertization of Copyright, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES
AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 345, 345 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (lamenting that copyright has
expanded to such an extent that it “now resemble[s] the ‘fee simple’ ownership held by landowners”);
Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and Intellectual Property,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (recognizing that “invention and creation occurs absent the grant of
intellectual property”).
73
Greene, supra note 6, at 529; see also id. at 522 (noting that “black cultural production is at the
center of expressive creativity in American culture and has been since the slave songs of the 1800’s and
blues and jazz of the 1900’s, up through the rap music of today”).
74
See id. at 534–35 (describing the problems with such expansion, including its encouragement of
“rent seeking” and its rewarding of entertainment conglomerates).
75
Id. at 529 (alterations in original) (quoting Deborah Tussey, iPods and Prairie Fires: Designing
Legal Regimes for Complex Intellectual Property Systems, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 105, 118 (2007)); see also Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social
Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 603 (2003)
(arguing that “incentive-based social progress justifications for intellectual property fail” to “justify
current copyright, patent, and trade secret models of intellectual property protection”).
76
Cf. Lisa P. Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 189, 216 (2006) (arguing that “other incentive structures exist to stimulate the creation of new
works and inventions”).
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system failed to protect the returns to labor, real estate, and personal
property through a private property regime, other powerful reasons to work
and to create and invest in property would still remain. As Mark McKenna
wrote, “[h]ighly successful people in any field tend to be intensely
competitive and strongly desire recognition among the elite in their
particular field.”77
Although economic incentives surely impact individual effort, the
magnitude of their effect varies depending on the circumstances for all
types of property. Novels would still get written without existing forms of
copyright, just as individuals would still pursue fame without a right of
publicity. On a theoretical level, one simply cannot conclude that the
negative effect of reducing property protections on creative output would
be significant, while the negative effect on the pursuit of fame more
generally would be de minimis.
Measuring the empirical effects of incentives across property types
may be possible, but our legal system has allocated property rights without
reference to this kind of data, and right-of-publicity critics suggest no
methods for collecting it. The incentive critique of the right of publicity
necessarily, if implicitly, rests on the belief that empirical data is
unnecessary. Commercial property managers, laborers, authors, and
inventors earn their living directly from their activities and would,
therefore, not work hard enough without the returns that strong property
rights provide. Because athletes and star actors make so much money from
playing sports and making movies, however, the additional income made
possible by publicity rights could not possibly play a significant
incentivizing role.78
This common-sense reasoning is certainly contestable. Unlike athletes
in team sports, athletes competing in individual sports tend to earn a
greater percentage of their wealth from endorsements.79 Although top
professional golfers and tennis players may earn enough prize money to
keep them playing even if they made nothing from publicity, the same may
not be true of, for example, Olympic athletes. And to the extent that
Olympians would pursue gold equally vigorously without a right of
publicity because they enjoy their sport and the chance to compete with the
best athletes in the world, Phil Mickelson and Serena Williams would
likely pursue excellence in golf and tennis, respectively, even if they
received no money for playing—or at least much less than what they earn
now. In fact, many lesser talents dedicate substantial time and money to
77

McKenna, supra note 6, at 261.
Id. at 261–62.
79
For example, “star tennis players and golfers earn three to five times their prize money from
endorsements and other nontournament sources.” ROBERT H. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE’S GUIDE TO
AGENTS 107 (Stephen Greene Press 1989) (1982). But see id. at 107–09 (noting, though, that athletes
in team sports earn a lower percentage of their total income from exploiting publicity rights).
78
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80

improving their own golf and tennis games. Fanatics of these sports are
indistinguishable in many ways from the authors, songwriters, and
basement inventors who churn out creative works and inventions with little
realistic hope of ever earning a positive return.81 The need for incentives to
create any form of property is thus uncertain.
In this respect, incentives created by the returns to publicity are not
different from the rewards attributable to any other kind of property right.82
As an empirical matter, no one has more than a foggy notion about the
comparative effects of incentives on different types of property. And
gathering the relevant data may not even be possible. The incentive
argument thus fails to distinguish publicity rights from other property
protections. And unless right-of-publicity critics are prepared to reduce the
strength of all property rights, this critique is unlikely to convince courts
and legislatures to curtail the right of publicity.
b. Reducing Returns May Increase the Incentive To Work
Madow also demonstrated that if returns to publicity were eliminated,
celebrities might actually work harder to maintain a desired income level.83
This phenomenon too extends to all types of property. Whether one deals
with real or personal property, copyright or patent, or the right of publicity,
theory alone cannot predict whether an individual’s work output will
increase or decrease if returns are lowered. An individual might work less
because reduced income will make leisure activities relatively more
valuable, or she might work more to maintain an existing or desired
standard of living.84 Whether Brad Pitt would make more (or fewer)
movies if he did not have a right to publicity is an empirical question
indistinguishable in form from the question of whether Stephen King
would write more (or fewer) novels if copyright law permitted additional
forms of copying without compensating the author. Again, right-ofpublicity critics fail to differentiate publicity from other kinds of property.

80
For example, some professional tennis players will “grind[] it out” for years on tour despite
earning far less than higher-ranked players. Editorial, How Much Do Modern-Day Tennis Players
Really Earn?, SPORT REV. (Mar. 29, 2010, 12:32 PM), http://www.thesportreview.com/
tsr/2010/03/tennis-player-earnings-wages.
81
Madow, supra note 2, at 216–17.
82
See id. at 205 (observing that arguments as to the incentives and rewards that private property
rights create have been articulated in support of the right of publicity).
83
See id. at 205 n.384 (citing prior work critiquing the economic arguments in favor of all forms
of private property); id. at 212 & nn.412–13 (highlighting prior work showing that the incentive effect
of weakening property rights is theoretically uncertain).
84
See Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711, 719 (1980) (observing that the idea that individuals will work less where they experience
reduced enjoyment of the “fruits of their productive undertakings” can be contrasted with the notion
that some individuals may work harder in a less certain environment to protect themselves if some of
their property is lost through regulation).
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c. The Inefficient Pursuit of Property Rights
Finally, Madow argued that publicity rights create excessive incentives
to seek fame.85 Once again, however, the same can be said of many types
of property. Numerous get-rich-quick schemers waste their time pursuing
an impossible dream of success and wealth. Indeed, many people pursue
careers in business or law in the fruitless pursuit of a high income that most
will never obtain. Those who have explored the issue have concluded that
strong publicity rights are not incontrovertibly justified for any type of
property right.86 As Lawrence A. Sullivan reminds us, it has long been
common knowledge that overprotecting intellectual property “can distort
allocation, hurt consumers and impede further innovation.”87 The
possibility that publicity rights over-incentivize celebrity again fails to
distinguish them from other property. Any form of property can be
subjected to the same critique.
B. A Critique of the Allocational Defense of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity’s most widely accepted justification rests on the
85

Madow, supra note 2, at 216–18. Dogan and Lemley share this belief. See Dogan & Lemley,
Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1163–64 (stating that courts have “allow[ed] right of publicity
claims to run roughshod over the speech interests of the public,” and that “[s]ociety doesn’t need to
encourage more celebrities or more marketing of celebrity image”). Volokh, however, maintains that
the right of publicity need not exist in order for these sorts of incentives to arise. See Volokh, supra
note 9, at 910–11 (arguing that without publicity rights people would still strive to become famous).
86
There is considerable support for the conclusion that absolute protection of property rights
would be inefficient. See, e.g., 1 FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY:
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE ch. 6, 6 (1996), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v1.pdf (“‘[S]ome people jump . . . to the conclusion that the
broader the patent rights are, the better it is for innovation, and that isn’t always correct, because we
have an innovation system in which one innovation builds on another. . . . [T]he breadth and utilization
of patent rights can . . . have adverse effects in the long run on innovation.’” (quoting Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition (1995), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC101295.shtm (statement of Joseph Stiglitz, Professor, Stanford
Univ.))); see also Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 985, 987 (1999) (“Legal scholars have failed to appreciate that unconstrained monopoly pricing is
not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees. . . . [A]llowing patentees to raise price all the way to
the monopoly level is a little like giving them a license to steal car radios—it produces a social cost (to
car owners) far greater than the private benefit.”); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual
Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 453, 460–61, 473 (2001) (suggesting
that recent calls for absolute intellectual property rights effectively abandon the goal of providing
incentives to improve consumer welfare in favor of “maximizing the wealth of current rights holders
regardless of the effects on aggregate economic welfare”); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–701
(1998) (discussing how more intellectual property rights can lead to fewer innovations in the
biomedical research context); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals To Sell or License Intellectual Property
and the Antitrust Duty To Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 215–16 (1999) (citing studies
showing that competition is more important to innovation than patent protection).
87
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets?: An Inquiry into
Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Broadband Regulation as Applied to “The New Economy,” 52
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 41, 62 (2001).
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need to efficiently allocate resources to avoid devaluing publicity. In
support of this view, Judge Richard Posner has argued that just as
overgrazing the proverbial tragic commons would render it valueless for
those raising sheep, eliminating the right of publicity would erode the
value of celebrity through over-exposure.89 Privatizing the commons
efficiently protected its value for sheepherders.90 By limiting the use of
celebrity to the highest bidders, publicity rights also optimize the value of
fame. Madow argued that this justification for publicity rights fared no
better than the incentive argument.91 Again, his critique applies to other
forms of property and therefore fails to distinguish the right of publicity.
1. Private Allocation of Publicity Does Not Increase Social Welfare
Madow presented three critiques of the allocation defense of publicity
rights. First, he showed that creating a need to license the use of a
celebrity’s persona may actually block efficient small-scale uses,92 such as
the printing of small runs of T-shirts. In these types of situations, the
transaction costs of obtaining numerous licenses would exceed the
expected return.93
Second, Madow claimed that any loss in value to a celebrity’s persona
due to overexposure is not a legitimate social concern.94 The number of

88
See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437–38 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that
“[w]ithout the artificial scarcity created by the protection of one’s likeness, that likeness would be
exploited commercially until the marginal value of its use is zero,” and that “[the likeness] soon would
be overused, as each user will not consider the externality effect his use will have on others”); Grady,
supra note 39, at 116–24 (arguing that publicity rights should only restrict uses of a celebrity’s identity
that would decrease that celebrity’s publicity value).
89
See Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 39, at 411 (“There is perfectly good economic reason
for assigning the property right in a photograph used for advertising purposes to the photographed
individual: this assignment assures that the advertiser to whom the photograph is most valuable will
purchase it. Making the photograph the communal property of advertisers would not achieve this
goal.”). For the classic application of the tragedy-of-the-commons argument to property rights
generally, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968), and
for a comparison of the right of publicity with the “common pool problem,” see Grady, supra note 39,
at 102–04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
See Hardin, supra note 89, at 1245, 1248 (contending that restricting unchecked individual use
of the commons preserves its value for society as a whole).
91
See Madow, supra note 2, at 220–25 (calling into question Justice Posner’s argument that the
right of publicity “prevents inefficient overexploitation of celebrity personas,” and pointing out that no
court has cited the argument in support of the right of publicity).
92
Madow explained that efficient uses may not come about where the most efficient use of a
celebrity persona would involve numerous small-scale uses that could not reasonably be licensed
because of transaction costs. Id. at 222–24 & n.445.
93
Id.
94
See id. at 224 (“Advertisers will use [a celebrity’s] photograph until it has been squeezed dry of
advertising value. . . . We are not dealing here with a nonrenewable natural resource like land. . . .
After all, there would be no ‘tragedy’ in the classic parable if the herdsmen, after depleting their
common pasture, could simply move on to another one.”); McKenna, supra note 6, at 273–74 (noting
that the decline in the value to a celebrity’s persona due to overexposure is uncertain and observing that
any loss is not a public one).
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celebrities available for advertising purposes is practically limitless.95
There is, therefore, no negative social impact when the value of one
celebrity persona is reduced because advertisers will simply find a new
celebrity persona.
Third, Madow argued that, unlike physical resources, celebrity often
becomes more valuable through exposure.96 Publicity, like all forms of
information, it is argued, is “nonrivalrous” and “cannot be used up.”97 A
picture of a celebrity, for example, can be distributed widely, providing
equal enjoyment to all without diminishing the enjoyment of any.
Conversely, once a loaf of bread is eaten no one else can enjoy it.98 Since
enjoying a celebrity persona does not reduce its availability for others,
charging anything to permit the use of a celebrity’s persona would
inefficiently reduce consumption.99
2. Extending the Allocational Critique to Other Forms of Property
Once again, Madow’s critique is powerful and persuasive, but it cannot
be limited to the right of publicity. All property rights will be inefficiently
exploited if the transaction costs of licensing outweigh individual returns.
And efficient small-scale uses of publicity are unlikely to be substantially
more prevalent than efficient small-scale uses of other property rights. The
transaction costs of individually licensing patents and copyrights, for
example, may outweigh the benefit of individual uses just as those costs
may inhibit the use of celebrity images and personas.100 Even real estate,
in some cases, could be utilized most efficiently through open access.
Permitting the free use of empty lots in urban areas for community
farming, for example, could lead to more efficient use of vacant land,
because transaction costs might otherwise discourage efficient uses.101
Madow’s overexposure critique also extends to other forms of
property. Although inventors and authors would suffer private losses if
they could not maximize the price of their creations, greater use of patents
95

Madow, supra note 2, at 224; McKenna, supra note 6, at 273–74.
Madow, supra note 2, at 221–22.
97
Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Grady, supra note 39, at 99–100 (explaining the theories of public goods and private goods in
the context of the right to publicity); McKenna, supra note 6, at 257, 269 (stating that identity is
nonrivalrous).
98
See Grady, supra note 39, at 99 (“One person’s consumption of a loaf of bread limits the ability
of another person to get utility from the same bread.”).
99
See id. (using air as an example of a good for which it would not make economic sense to
charge for its use).
100
In the copyright area, this problem is partially addressed through large licensing organizations
that reduce transaction costs. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4–6,
10–13, 15, 20–23 (1979) (explaining the copyright licensing system).
101
For example, a recent effort to set up an urban garden on an undeveloped strip of land in San
Diego recently took more than two years and $46,000 in permits. Rebecca Tolin, The $46,000
Question, SAN DIEGO CITY BEAT (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.sdcitybeat.com/sandiego/article-6173the-$46000-question.html.
96

2011]

WHY COMPETITION POLICY SHOULD LIMIT THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

773

and copyrights would benefit the public by stimulating improved
inventions and new creative works.102 A particular invention, song, or
work of fiction might lose value from overexposure, but there would
always be additional inventions, songs, and stories to take their place.
Likewise, with real estate, owners of large tracts of open land might lose
some value if trespassing were permitted, but the public at large could
benefit from greater access for hiking and recreational uses.103
In some cases, allocating the use of property carefully would produce
efficient results, but each case requires individualized empirical analysis.
As Lemley writes, “[r]educing the distribution of information is a good
thing if, but only if, such information is in fact overproduced or
overdistributed. In other words, this justification for intellectual property
depends on proof that there is in fact a tragedy of the commons in
information.”104 Commentators cannot definitively conclude that private
property rights always yield efficient allocations of land, copyrights, and
patents, but are unnecessary to the efficient use of publicity. Neither
Madow nor any other publicity right critic has shown that publicity rights
are significantly less likely to lead to efficient allocations of the use of
celebrity personas than other forms of property.
Madow’s third argument concerning publicity’s nonrivalrous nature is
as applicable to all forms of intellectual property as it is to the right of
publicity, because they are all intangible.105 At first glance, however, this
102
Mark Lemley has persuasively demonstrated the shortcomings of the allocational justification
for all forms of intellectual property. He recognizes that:
The idea of a tragedy of the information commons . . . is fundamentally flawed
because it misunderstands the nature of information. A tragedy of the commons
occurs when a finite natural resource is depleted by overuse. Information cannot be
depleted, however; in economic terms, its consumption is nonrivalrous. It simply
cannot be “used up.” Indeed, copying information actually multiplies the available
resources, not only by making a new physical copy but by spreading the idea and
therefore permitting others to use and enjoy it. The result is that rather than a
tragedy, an information commons is a “comedy” in which everyone benefits. The
notion that information will be depleted by overuse simply ignores basic economics.
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
129, 143 (2004); see also id. at 144 (“[T]he argument that we need to grant control over distribution to
encourage less distribution [of intellectual property] is at base anti-market.”).
103
Such access has been recognized in a variety of contexts. England, for example, recently
enacted a right to roam that grants public access to undeveloped private land. Jerry L. Anderson,
Britain’s Right To Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
375, 377–78 (2007). A similar customary right, known as “allemansrätten,” exists in Finland, Norway,
and Sweden. Id. at 404. Some American states recognize a public right to beach access over private
land. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984)
(recognizing that “private landowners may not in all instances” deny members of the public access to
the beach across their privately-owned land).
104
Lemley, supra note 102, at 143.
105
See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse Possession for Intellectual
Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept To Resolve Conflicts Between Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 327, 365 (2003) (explaining that
intellectual property is nonrivalrous).
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aspect of Madow’s critique appears to distinguish the right of publicity
from real and personal property—both of which are presumed to be
consumable, rivalrous, and excludible.106 Upon closer examination,
however, one cannot neatly distinguish among different types of property
based on whether enjoyment by some prevents others from also enjoying
the property. From a practical perspective, physical property is often as
nonrivalrous as many forms of intellectual property. Although any
particular loaf of bread is consumable, so is any particular picture of a
celebrity.107 In both instances, the real issue is whether the available
supply of substitutes enables most consumers to obtain all that they would
reasonably demand. One person’s consumption of a loaf of bread is as
irrelevant to the ability of others to acquire and enjoy bread as one person’s
consumption of a picture of a celebrity is irrelevant to others’ ability to
enjoy the picture. Indeed, it may be easier to create scarcity in a picture—
for example, in a limited-edition high-quality poster—than in a loaf of
bread.108
Theoretically, distinguishing the right of publicity from other forms of
property cannot rest solely on the right’s potentially nonrivalrous nature,
because, in significant cases, personal property may be just as
nonrivalrous.109 Distinguishing among types of property on this ground
would again require empirical data demonstrating the degree to which
publicity is in fact less rivalrous than other forms of property. None of the
critics have gathered the data necessary to make that empirical claim or
even explained how one might obtain it. As a result, the right-of-publicity
critique again cannot distinguish publicity from other forms of property.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF PROPERTY’S MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Proponents of the right of publicity have advanced two moral
justifications for the right—first, that a celebrity creates and thus deserves
her fame, and second, that autonomous individuals should have the right to
106
Peter T. Wendel, Protecting Newly Discovered Antiquities: Thinking Outside the “Fee
Simple” Box, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015, 1030–31 (2007).
107
To be sure, intellectual property protects the concepts of invention, expression, and publicity,
rather than particular manifestations. But as a practical matter, it is the physical manifestations that
matter. The law could not prevent individuals from imagining copies of inventions, using their own
photographic memories to recall copyright-protected material word-for-word, or visualizing a celebrity
in one’s mind. Only the physical manifestations—making, using, or selling a patented invention;
copying a work protected by copyright; or using a celebrity’s identity—are, or could be, the concern of
the law.
108
Conversely, the quintessential public good, air, might be quite rivalrous and excludible with
respect to individuals who need supplements of oxygen to survive.
109
The law has historically viewed real property as unique and excludible. See United Church of
Med. Ctr. v. Med. Ctr. Comm’n, 689 F.2d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1982) (“It is settled beyond the need for
citation . . . that a given piece of property is considered to be unique . . . .”). For many uses, however,
the same principles apply to real property as to personal property. That is, there are sufficiently
acceptable substitute parcels of real property that are reasonably available for most uses.
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control the use of their identity. However powerful the prevailing critique
of these purported justifications may be, each theory can be applied with
roughly equal vigor to any form of property. The critique’s persuasiveness
is, therefore, again blunted by its overbreadth.
A. Critiquing the Lockean Moral Defense for the Right of Publicity
Lockean moral theory proposes that one deserves the product of one’s
labor, and it has been used to justify all forms of property rights, including
the right of publicity.110 Madow argues that Locke’s theory is inapplicable
to celebrities because they do not deserve the value flowing from their
fame.111 Famous people, he contends, are rarely solely responsible for
their success, both in the sense that others help the celebrity directly and
because fame is dependent on the fans whose adoration constitutes the
celebrity’s fame.112 This reasoning once again applies to all forms of
property. Artists and inventors build on what came before and all property
owners depend on social structures that create demand and facilitate
markets. Without society, property would have no value. So, if a celebrity
is not morally entitled to the value of fame, because others help create it,
then no one is entitled to the value of any form of property.
1. Lockean Theory Fails To Justify the Right of Publicity
Proponents of the right of publicity often contend that the Lockean
labor theory of property applies to publicity, because celebrities have a
moral right to the wealth that they create in their public personas just as an
artisan, author, or inventor deserves the wealth generated by his or her
physical creations.113
Madow attacked the application of Lockean theory to publicity,
arguing that fame is often unearned.114 “[P]lenty of people become famous
nowadays,” he maintained, “through sheer luck, through involvement in
110
2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 25–33, 44 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1970) (1690); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 382, 396 (2003).
111
Madow, supra note 2, at 175–76 & n.239.
112
Id. at 195.
113
For an overview of the origins of the right of publicity, see supra Part II.A. For articulations
of the labor theory of property, as applied to intellectual property, see Carson v. Here’s Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983); McFarland v. E & K Corp., Civil No. 4-89727, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1496, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 1991); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.
Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); Mossoff, supra note 110, at 396; David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just
Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673, 677, 682, 686
(1981).
114
See Madow, supra note 2, at 160–61 (observing that technological innovation in the early
twentieth century allowed for the fabrication of fame); see also Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity,
supra note 2, at 1183–84 (“[I]n a capitalist economy, people should not be punished for making money
from something they have a right to do. A right of publicity interferes with this fundamental moral
right and is therefore unjustified.”).
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public scandal, or through criminal or grossly immoral conduct.”115
Moreover, even the most successful celebrities owe their fame to social
factors over which they have no control or to others who are instrumental
in creating the value in the celebrity’s persona.116 Because no celebrity is
entirely self-made, celebrities have no moral entitlement to the value of
their publicity.
2. Can One Ever Deserve One’s Property?
Lockean theorists assume that property has an identifiable creator who
deserves to possess rights with respect to that property.117 But just as fame
is rarely created by the celebrity alone, individuals rarely, if ever, create
anything in isolation. All property arises from the ideas and labors of
others, adding to the foundation upon which others will build.118 In the
mid-nineteenth century, Joseph Story recognized that not all authors
deserve property rights in their books.119 He wrote that “[l]anguage is
common to all,” and that
literary works must contain much which is old and well
known, mixed up with something which perhaps is new,
peculiar, and original. . . . The difficulty here is to distinguish
what belongs to the exclusive labors of a single mind, from
what are the common sources of the materials of the
knowledge, used by all.120
Just as a celebrity cannot take full credit for her fame, all creative work is

115

Madow, supra note 2, at 179.
See id. at 184–95 (describing the ways in which celebrity images are not the product of labor);
see also Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1179 (“The personality the court assigns
to the celebrity in those cases is not simply the celebrity’s own image, but an amalgam of the
contributions of writers, cinematographers, and fellow actors.”); id. at 1180–84 (discussing the moral
basis for the right of publicity); McKenna, supra note 6, at 252–58, 263–68 (arguing that labor theories
do not provide a basis for the right of publicity).
117
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
118
John Rawls recognized that the distribution of goods depends on talents and abilities that are
shaped “by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good fortune.
Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive
shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.” JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (1971). Even if efforts are made to control socially-contingent
factors such as educational opportunity, the distribution of wealth is still “to be determined by the
natural distribution of abilities and talents. . . . [D]istributive shares are decided by the outcome of the
natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective.” Id. at 73–74.
119
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 939 (8th ed. 1861).
120
Id. § 940; see also Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 618–19 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)
(“[I]n literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract
sense, are strictly new and original throughout. . . . Virgil borrowed much from Homer; Bacon drew
from earlier as well as contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning of his profession;
and even Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly our boast as the brightest originals would be
found to have gathered much from the abundant stories of current knowledge and classical studies in
their days.”).
116
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121

constructed from the shoulders of the giants who came before.
Story, like Locke, assumed that a creator more deserving than others
could, at least, sometimes be identified, even though others also
contributed.122 But it is not so. Although individual talent is highly
relevant to creativity, personal assets of any sort (and our ability to
cultivate them) are, in a sense, bestowed upon us rather than self-created.123
Some individuals are born with certain abilities that others lack. Likewise,
a supportive upbringing creates certain opportunities for some people, but
not others.124 Those who lack these opportunities are better classified as
less lucky than as less deserving.125
Even if it were possible to identify a single potentially deserving
individual, property would have no value without what the Supreme Court
has referred to as an “‘organized society’”126 to appreciate the creation and
make a market in which it can be sold.127 To be sure, an individual creator
of something valuable may be morally entitled to some reward. But that
reward need not be a property right. It could instead be what the Supreme
Court has called “‘the privileges of living in an organized society,’”128 and
121
See 1 ROBERT BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY 25 (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1961)
(1628) (“A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a Giant may see farther than a Giant himself; I may
likely add, alter, and see farther than my predecessors.”); UMBERTO ECO, Borges and My Anxiety of
Influence, in ON LITERATURE 118, 121 (2002) (recognizing “the debts [we all] owe[] to the universe of
culture”).
122
See 2 STORY, supra note 119, § 940 (“The character of some works . . . may, beyond question,
be in the highest sense original . . . although [they may] have freely used the thoughts of others.”).
123
See, e.g., MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS 19 (2008) (“People don’t rise from nothing. We
do owe something to parentage and patronage. . . . The culture we belong to and the legacies passed
down by our forebears shape the patterns of our achievement in ways we cannot begin to imagine.”).
124
Id.
125
The discussion in the text raises clear parallels to the philosophical debate over moral luck.
Thomas Nagel set forth a taxonomy of the ways luck may impact moral judgments, including luck with
respect to (1) results, (2) the circumstances in which one finds oneself, (3) the way in which one is
constituted, and (4) the antecedent circumstances that are relevant to particular conduct. THOMAS
NAGEL, MORAL LUCK IN MORTAL QUESTIONS 28 (1979); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK
39 (1981) (“Scepticism about the freedom of morality from luck cannot leave the concept of morality
where it was, any more than it can remain undisturbed by scepticism about the very closely related
image we have of there being a moral order, within which our actions have a significance which may
not be accorded to them by mere social recognition.”).
126
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623 (1981) (quoting Carmichael v. S.
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937)).
127
Value in real estate, for example, exists only because we live together in a society whose
members desire to possess it. See David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property
Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 119 (2005) (“[T]he critical importance of the media and the
public in creating value for a celebrity’s right of publicity can be taken to support the view that most of
that value may be socially created, not unlike the value of a choice piece of real estate in an urban
area.”). More generally, Felix Cohen, in a somewhat different context, made plain the direct
connection between society and value. He derided the notion that the law should recognize as property
anything of value, explaining that “[t]he vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to
base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a
sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected.” Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935).
128
Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 623 (quoting Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 522).
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the creator’s responsibility to share the value of a creation with others can
be understood “as part of the burden of common citizenship.”129 Whatever
competing moral entitlement a particular individual may have to her
creations, she cannot claim a moral right to exclude entirely, and without
qualification, the very society that gives her property value.130
Nonetheless, one can make evaluative judgments. Lazy individuals
who treat their parents poorly may have less of a moral claim to the wealth
they inherit than those who had little parental support through their
formative years yet still became financially successful through hard work.
But property rights in American society are not allocated in this way. The
law does not distinguish the deserving from the undeserving on a relative
scale. An inventor receives the same patent rights whether he labored for
years or came upon the invention in an afternoon. With respect to all
traditional forms of property, what’s mine is mine, whether I deserve it or
not.
Neither Madow nor those critics who have come after him provide a
convincing basis for treating the right of publicity differently. Some
celebrities, as Madow emphasizes, have fame bestowed upon them.131 His
most evocative example is Donna Rice, who earned a “No Excuses” Jeans
advertising spot as a result of her forays with Senator, and then-presidential
candidate, Gary Hart.132 At the other end of the spectrum, however, are
entertainers, such as Bruce Springsteen133 and Chuck D.,134 who, with few
129

Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
To be clear, allowing property owners to exclude other members of society from using their
property may be a wise policy decision in most cases, but it cannot be derived from Lockean moral
theory. See McKenna, supra note 6, at 254–55 (stating that Lockean morality is grounded in labor).
131
Madow, supra note 2, at 179.
132
See id. (citing the Rice example, among others).
133
Springsteen, a successful musician for over thirty years, is well-known for supporting many
charitable causes, including human rights, workers’ rights, and local food banks in the cities in which
he plays. See Gary Shelton, Re-Born in the USA, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Apr. 2, 2006, at 3X
(“Over the years, Bruce Springsteen has donated time, effort or proceeds to help fight world hunger,
Parkinson’s disease and pediatric AIDS. He has supported the Special Olympics, Amnesty
International and the rain forests.”). He is also well known for refusing to permit his image or identity
to be used for endorsement purposes. He humorously described his reluctance to associate his persona
with products during his speech inducting U2 into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame:
Well[,] there I was sitting down on the couch in my pajamas . . . . I was doing
one of my favorite things—I was tallying up all the money I passed up in
endorsements over the years . . . and thinking of all the fun I could have had with
it. . . . Now, personally, I live an insanely expensive lifestyle that my wife barely
tolerates. I burn money, and that calls for huge amounts of cash flow. But I also
have a ludicrous image of myself that keeps me from truly cashing in. . . . You can
see my problem. Woe is me.
Jonathan, Posting of Transcript: Bruce Springsteen Inducts U2 into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame,
U2 STATION NEWS BLOG (Mar. 17, 2005, 7:35 AM), http://www.u2station.com/news/archives/2005/
03/transcript_bruc.php.
134
Chuck D. was the lead rapper for the groundbreaking group Public Enemy. According to K.J.
Greene, who once represented the group, “Chuck D. had long vehemently denounced the sale of [fortyounce malt liquor] in black communities and was outraged over the use” of his voice in a beer
commercial. Greene, supra note 6, at 540.
130
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advantages, have cultivated a particular persona at significant personal
cost. When contrasted with Rice, Springsteen and Chuck D. are more
deserving of the fruits of their accomplishments, whether those fruits come
as returns from music sales or publicity.
In The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that, to
distinguish law from morality, one must take the perspective of the “bad
man” who cares nothing about moral principles.135 In allocating property
rights, however, American society awards rights based on the prospective
of the good man who deserves his creations as much as anyone can. The
law apparently prefers to reward Rice undeservingly, rather than deprive
Springsteen and Chuck D. of the power to control their publicity.136 Rights
are awarded whether or not they are deserved. Although one can imagine a
property rights allocation system that prioritizes the degree to which an
individual deserves to be rewarded, American property law generally does
not do so. The right of publicity thus cannot be distinguished from other
property on the ground that it too does not limit its rewards to the
deserving.
B. Critiquing the Autonomy-Personality Defense of the Right of Publicity
Alice Haemmerli contends that publicity rights are necessary to enable
individuals to properly define (or constitute) themselves as individual
human beings by exerting control over aspects of the world around them.137
“Identity remains something intrinsic to the individual,” she claims,
“subject to individual control as an autonomy-based property right, no
135
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“A man
who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practi[c]ed by his neighbors is likely
nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if
he can.”).
136
Moreover, that one may be morally entitled to keep what one needs to survive, or even
flourish, from what he creates does not mean that a society is morally compelled to grant an individual
a property right in all, or even the predominant share, of the social surplus flowing from his efforts:
[I]t is often assumed that once one speaks of someone having a “right” . . . to
something one has concluded all debate on the question whether justice requires that
he should receive it. But one can accept the notion that there are legitimate claims
of entitlement without being driven to the position that they must be absolute.
....
. . . [A] great deal of coercive dispossession through taxation, may be permissible
or even morally required in a just society.
Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 885 (1976).
137
Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 431. Similar arguments have been made with respect to other
types of property. See, e.g., Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural
Consequences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 167–71 (1994) (discussing Hegel’s
deontological justification of property, his rejection of the idea of copyright, and his emphasis on selfexpression); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 337–39 (1988)
(examining Hegel’s treatment of intellectual property); Wendy Lim, Towards Developing a Natural
Law Jurisprudence in the U.S. Patent System, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561,
579–80 (2003) (attempting to reconcile Hegel’s personality theory with patent and copyright law).
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matter what or who has affected its level of fame.”
She contends that a
person’s identity is her own not because she has earned it, but because a
just society must respect the manner in which its members define and
constitute themselves.139
Haemmerli’s defense of publicity rights has been critiqued most
effectively by Dogan and Lemley. As with the earlier critiques, they
effectively counter Hammerli’s justifications for publicity rights,140 but
they do so in a way that could also be used to critique all other forms of
property.
1. Autonomy-Personality Theory Cannot Justify the Right of Publicity
Dogan and Lemley first demonstrate that the right of publicity
enhances the autonomy and personality interests of one person only by
harming the interests of another.141 Those who desire to use celebrity
images on clothing and other products, for example, are expressing their
own personality through the use of those images. Recognizing publicity
rights thus reduces and limits the autonomy and personality rights of fans
who seek to use celebrity personas, just as failing to recognize publicity
rights would negatively impact celebrities.142 A celebrity is not morally
entitled to deny others the ability to autonomously express their own
personalities simply to protect his or her own reciprocal interest.143
Therefore, the right of publicity cannot be justified in this way.
138

Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 431.
Id.; see also Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809,
830 (2008) (explaining that “holders of constitutive resources are personally attached to their properties
since and insofar as they reflect their identity, because such resources are external projections of their
personality”).
140
See infra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
141
See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1179 (suggesting that a strong right
of publicity “comes at a significant cost to the public”).
142
See id. at 1182–83 & n.100 (criticizing Haemmerli on the ground that, in advancing the
autonomy justification for the right of publicity, “she offers no reason to privilege the autonomy of the
celebrity protected by the right of publicity over the autonomy of speakers such a right would curtail”);
see also Timothy W. Havlir, Note, Is Fantasy Baseball Free Speech? Redefining the Balance Between
the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229,
238–39 (2008) (“A celebrity or athlete who is able to market his persona is afforded the opportunity to
preserve the full commercial value of his fame, as well as prevent others from free riding on that
value.”). But cf. Friedman, supra note 137, at 168 (making a similar point with respect to copyright,
noting that Hegel “argues that when the copy, or by extension, the derivative work, embodies the
‘intellectual and technical skill of the copyist,’ the new author is entitled to property in the creation”
(quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 68 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821))).
143
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir.
1996) (“The right of publicity allows celebrities to avoid the emotional distress caused by unwanted
commercial use of their identities. Publicity rights, however, are meant to protect against the loss of
financial gain, not mental anguish.”), aff’d, 182 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1999); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (“As has been observed, works of parody or other
distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint, good substitutes for
conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not generally threaten markets for celebrity
memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed to protect.” (citing Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974)).
139
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Second, Dogan and Lemley recognize that the right of publicity is not
limited to the high-minded protection of autonomy interests; rather, it
allocates the revenue generated by the use of a celebrity’s identity.144
“Even assuming that human dignity includes the right to prevent people
from making true statements about you to sell a commercial product,” they
contend that such a right “fits uneasily” with current law because publicity
rights are rarely used to prevent undignified uses.145 “[A]lmost always,”
Dogan and Lemley argue, the right of publicity is employed to
“maximiz[e] the celebrity’s profit.”146
Third, they contend that autonomy advocates have failed to explain
why the law should protect publicity in some situations—including
advertising and merchandising—but not others, such as news reporting,
documentary films, and biographies.147 “A moral rights theory,” Dogan
and Lemley argue, “needs to be able to explain not just why we grant
certain rights, but also why we don’t grant others.”148 Even accepting that
celebrities have a moral right to control their personas, Dogan and Lemley
argue, any such right would not find support in the existing right of
publicity.149
2. Extending the Dogan and Lemley Critique to All Forms of Property
Each aspect of the Dogan and Lemley critique of the autonomy and
personality justifications for publicity rights applies to other forms of
property. Just as the right of publicity restrains the autonomy and personal
development of non-celebrities, other property rights restrain the ability of
non-owners to autonomously form their own personalities. To the extent
that my ownership of something plays a role in constituting me, others are
144
See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1181 (“The celebrity, the argument
goes, has rights to the fruits of her labor and, at the very least, has the right to prevent others from
taking those fruits for their own personal gain.”).
145
Id. at 1181–82.
146
Id. at 1182. Dogan and Lemley further note that, with trademarks
[t]here is simply no inherent right to be the only one to make money by trading on
the value of a trademark. The law permits such “free riding” in numerous cases
where the defendant benefits from proximity to the plaintiff’s mark, so long as the
use does not increase consumer search costs.
Id. at 1204.
147
For example, Haemmerli asserts that “the publicity rights conversation is [not] about . . . all
uses of identity that might offend a person’s autonomy as such, but—by definition—with commercial
exploitation of that identity.” Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 433.
148
Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1183. They acknowledge that current
law could be wrong in failing to recognize an across-the-board publicity right, but they correctly point
out that those who seek to justify the right on autonomy grounds do not make that claim. Id. at 1183
n.101. Nimmer, who was the first to rely on Lockean moral theory, was also the first to declare that
news reporting should be exempt from the right of publicity. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying
text. Haemmerli did not question that certain uses of publicity should be exempted from the right’s
scope. See Haemmerli, supra note 9, at 433 (“We are concerned not with all uses of identity that might
offend a person’s autonomy as such, but—by definition—with commercial exploitation.”).
149
Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1182–84.
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denied the use of that property in constituting themselves. For example, if
one sibling takes an heirloom of great sentimental value from a deceased
parent’s estate, other siblings are denied property that may be critical to
their autonomy and personality as well. Possession of any property that
truly serves to constitute an individual is therefore unavailable for
constituting others in much the same way that a celebrity’s control of her
image denies fans the right to use that image in certain self-constituting
ways.150
The similarity of effect on non-owners is even clearer with other forms
of intellectual property. By protecting the inventor or creator through
patent and copyright, the law supports the creator’s autonomy and
personality while simultaneously restricting the autonomy and personality
of others who seek to invent or create in ways that would be deemed
infringing or copying. In this regard, these types of property are also
indistinguishable from the right of publicity.
The most powerful aspects of Dogan and Lemley’s criticism of
Haemmerli’s defense of the right of publicity are that she (1) fails to
account for the right’s protecting returns that are unrelated to autonomy
and personality interests, and (2) permits exceptions to the protection of
publicity rights in certain instances that do raise autonomy and personality
concerns.
All property rights, however, are riddled with similar anomalies.151
Estates, for example, are divided among heirs based on the property’s
market value. The property’s constitutive character for the particular heirs
involved is a peripheral concern at best.152 And real estate ownership
rights must give way to zoning regulation, aircraft over-flight, and eminent
domain regardless of the impact on autonomy and personality interests.153
Personal property rights may also be limited, for example, to protect

150
The problem may be even greater with real and personal property, because only one person
can practically possess a particular tangible object at a given time. Indeed, real and personal property
with significant constitutive value may be among the few types of property that are truly excludable
and consumable, because reasonable substitutes generally do not exist. Rights of publicity may thus be
distinguishable from real and personal property in this regard, but in a way that makes protection of
publicity rights more appropriate, not less so.
151
See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 84, at 715–17 (mentioning several arguments for
private property and contending that “each depends on empirical assumptions additional to that of
rational maximizing behavior”).
152
Compare Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 914, 917–18 (S.D. 1946) (giving no
consideration to constitutive interests in a partition action), with Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E.2d
754, 761–64 (W. Va. 2004) (taking constitutive interests into account).
153
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (“In affirming the City’s
authority to take petitioners’ properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may
entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation. We emphasize that nothing in our opinion
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.” (footnote
omitted)).
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endangered species of animals.
Similarly, patents have exceptions for
scientific research,155 and owners are not always entitled to enjoin
infringers.156 And copyright, of course, does not prohibit fair uses.157
Moral rights grounded in autonomy or personality may be unable to
explain the limits on the right of publicity, but they also fail to explain the
limits on other forms of private property. Again, the critique of publicity
rights is also a critique of all property rights.158
C. The Right of Publicity’s Lack of Pedigree
The analysis above demonstrates that the prevailing critique extends
beyond publicity rights to all property rights. Although that alone cannot
justify the right of publicity, it does help explain why such an undeniably
powerful critique has failed to influence courts or legislatures. Unless
judges and lawmakers are prepared to contest all forms of private property,
the critique’s ability to influence policy is unsurprisingly blunted.
Some critics might argue that this analysis ignores history.159 Whereas
most forms of property have existed for centuries, courts did not recognize
publicity rights until the mid-twentieth century, and broad recognition did
154
See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(f) (2006) (prohibiting the sale or
offer for sale of endangered species generally); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64–68 (1979) (holding
that commercial trade in eagle feathers without paying compensation to those who own them is
prohibited).
155
A longstanding exception to patent law protection permits the use of patented technology for
research purposes. See Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 195 (2005)
(describing a special exception applicable to research designed to support a new drug application with
the FDA); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (construing the
experimental use exception narrowly and acknowledging the narrow defense to infringement performed
“‘for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry’” (quoting Roche Prods.,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute as recognized in
Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997))); Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp.
2d 420, 425 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (explaining that “the experimental use defense remains viable and may
be asserted in those cases in which the allegedly infringing use of the patent is made for experimental,
non-profit purposes only” (citations omitted)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Giese v. Pierce Chem. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35–37 (D. Mass. 1998) (using the restrictive
definition of the traditional common-law-doctrine experimental use exception established in Roche).
156
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (rejecting the rule that
patent infringement should always be enjoined).
157
See infra Part V.B for a distinction between the right of publicity and other forms of property
on free speech grounds.
158
Haemmerli’s autonomy theory may simply be a poor justification for property of any sort. But
that is precisely the problem with each of the publicity rights critics’ arguments. They demonstrate that
all purported justifications for property are, in fact, poor justifications.
159
Dogan and Lemley, for instance, observe:
Before the late nineteenth century, individuals had little recourse against the use
of their names or images by unauthorized parties . . . for either commercial or
noncommercial purposes. It is hard to overstate the contrast between then and now.
These days, virtually any profit-oriented use of a name or identity is presumed to be
wrongful, with the defendant bearing the burden of establishing that its use falls
within some protected exception.
Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1167 (footnote omitted).
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not occur until the 1970s.
In his 1993 article, Madow identified
numerous parallels between modern publicity rights disputes and conflicts
arising prior to the development of the right of publicity that affected
similar interests.161 For example, he cited the unauthorized use of
Benjamin Franklin’s likeness on snuffboxes and other paraphernalia,
contending that eighteenth-century celebrities saw no need for publicity
rights.162 This lack of pedigree might counsel in favor of demanding
stronger justification for the right of publicity than for other more
established property forms.
Celebrity, however, undeniably plays a greater role in modern society
than it did in eras before the right of publicity emerged. Professional
sports, the movie and television industries, and popular fiction either
emerged or expanded exponentially during the twentieth century. As
Nimmer recognized, when the right of publicity arose in the 1950s, “the
needs of Broadway and Hollywood” were far different from the use of
celebrity in popular culture in earlier times.163
In the last century, advertising’s significance to the economy has also
expanded dramatically.164 Obvious examples include radio and television,
which came to serve as important free sources of information and
entertainment that are supported entirely through advertising. The role of
advertising, however, has also expanded in print media and helped make
possible the revolutionary social changes brought on by the World Wide
Web. As the business of advertising has grown, the need for law to
regulate the use of celebrity persona in the advertising context seems
obvious, even if the particulars of that regulation may not be.
Courts and legislatures presumably see the enhanced role of celebrity
and the importance of advertising to the modern economy as justifying
some form of publicity rights.165 Limitations on that right are certainly

160
See id. at 1172–75 (outlining the impact of Haelan v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953), on the evolution of the right to privacy from 1953 onward).
161
See Madow, supra note 2, at 148–54 (citing examples of the commodification and marketing
of images of famous persons dating back to the eighteenth century).
162
See id. at 149 (“Franklin did not begrudge these entrepreneurs the profits they were deriving
from his image, nor did he resent their failure to seek his consent.”).
163
Nimmer, supra note 31, at 203; see also Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1210 (1986)
(“Commercialization of personality only recently has invaded our daily lives.”); Note, An Assessment
of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1703, 1713 (1983) (“If earlier conceptions of property failed to comprehend a property right in
publicity, that failure can be attributed to the fact that nothing in our experience before the early 1900’s
would have made such a right necessary.”).
164
See Madow, supra note 2, at 156–57 (describing dramatic changes in the scale and content of
advertising in the early nineteenth century).
165
See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f a well-known public
figure’s picture could be used freely to endorse commercial products, the value of his likeness would
disappear. Creating artificial scarcity preserves the value to him, to advertisers who contract for the use
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appropriate. But courts and legislatures will likely demand rationales that
rest on more than historical parallels from times when celebrities played a
far different role than they do today. Part V addresses the shortcomings in
the free speech limitation that courts have tried to impose on the right of
publicity, and Part VI posits that competition policy could more rationally
and effectively bind publicity rights without affecting the scope of other
types of property.
V. DISTINGUISHING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FROM OTHER FORMS OF
PROPERTY ON FREE SPEECH GROUNDS
Because the right of publicity limits the speech of those who seek to
exploit the identity of a celebrity, some courts have cited free speech
principles to limit the right of publicity’s scope.166 Courts have held that
of his likeness, and in the end, to consumers, who receive information from the knowledge that he is
being paid to endorse the product.”).
166
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is an
inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under the First
Amendment.”); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the First Amendment allows magazines to use celebrities’ names and likenesses in feature articles
without it being considered commercial speech); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[F]or celebrity exploitation advertising to be effective, the advertisement
must evoke the celebrity’s identity. . . . [E]ven if some forms of expressive activity, such as parody, do
rely on identity evocation, the first amendment hurdle will bar most right of publicity actions against
those activities.”); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 n.11 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Commentators have
also advocated limits on the right of publicity to accommodate First Amendment concerns.” (citing
James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L.
REV. 637, 671–72 (1973))); Valentine v. CBS, Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 433 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Use of a
name is not harmful simply because it is included in a publication sold for profit.”); Lane v. MRA
Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1220 n.70 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“Florida continues to recognize the
common law tort of invasion of privacy—commercial misappropriation of likeness.”); Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–10 (Cal. 2001) (seeking to determine whether the
use is transformative, as “when a work contains significant transformative elements, it is not only
especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the
economic interest protected by the right of publicity”); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 2d
802, 810 (Fla. 2005) (“Not only do these decisions demonstrate that the common usage of the term
‘commercial’ in the commercial misappropriation and right of publicity context is indeed limited to the
promotion of a product or service . . . but they also indicate that such works should be protected by the
First Amendment.” (citations omitted)); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003)
(recognizing that the weakness of the “relatedness” and “transformative” tests “is that they give too
little consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity have both expressive and
commercial components,” and seeking to identify the dominant purpose of these tests (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Treece, supra, at 671 (“Thus, when a plaintiff claims that the
unauthorized advertising use of his name has injured him, the initial inquiry should be how, not
whether, the first amendment protects advertising.”); Volokh, supra note 9, at 904 (dividing right-ofpublicity claims into four categories: “(1) ‘noncommercial speech’ genres that right of publicity law
favors, such as news, movies, and the like; (2) commercial advertisements for those noncommercial
speech genres; (3) other kinds of commercial advertisements; and (4) ‘noncommercial speech’ genres
that right of publicity law disfavors, such as sculptures, prints, T-shirts, and the like”). But see Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “when a distinctive voice of a
professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers
have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California”); Carson v. Here’s Johnny
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a celebrity’s right of publicity
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the right of publicity does not apply if the use of the celebrity’s identity is
sufficiently transformative, original, and creative.167 Right-of-publicity
claims based on the use of a celebrity’s name in a movie, novel, song, or
their image in a painting have thus repeatedly been rejected.168 A recent
case also refused, on First Amendment grounds, to find a right of publicity
where Major League Baseball player names and statistics were used to
operate a for-profit commercial fantasy baseball league.169 But courts have
been unable to apply the approach consistently, upholding right-ofpublicity claims involving the use of a celebrity’s name or likeness for
advertising170 or sale of the celebrity’s likeness.171
Commentators suggest that publicity rights have a more significant
impact on speech than other property rights and that the scope of the right
of publicity should therefore be narrowed to guard against excessive
speech restraints.172 The harshest right-of-publicity critics deride this
was invaded because a local entrepreneur “intentionally appropriated his identity for commercial
exploitation”). Dogan and Lemley similarly recognize a distinction between merchandising, where the
right of publicity applies, and “news reporting, biography, film, and certain forms of art,” where it does
not. Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1177. Roberta Kwall proposes
accommodating the right of publicity and free speech interests by varying the available remedy. Kwall,
Right of Publicity, supra note 41, at 47–49.
167
See, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937–38 (refusing to enforce a celebrity’s right of publicity
because of First Amendment interests); Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184–85 (determining that a feature
article in a magazine using altered photographs of film stills did not constitute pure commercial speech,
as “[a]ny commercial aspects are ‘inextricably entwined’ with expressive elements, and so they cannot
be separated out ‘from the fully protected whole’” (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & Cnty.
of S.F., 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990))); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Speech that entertains, like speech that informs, is protected
by the First Amendment because ‘[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive
for the protection of that basic right.’” (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948))).
168
See, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 938 (“While the right of publicity allows celebrities . . . to
enjoy the fruits of their labors, here [the artist] has added a significant creative component of his
own . . . . Permitting [the] right to publicity to trump [the artist’s] right of freedom of expression would
extinguish [the] right to profit from his creative enterprise.”).
169
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818,
823 (8th Cir. 2007).
170
See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (“To impersonate [the distinctive] voice [of a celebrity singer] is
to pirate her identity.”).
171
See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (applying the right of privacy to a charcoal sketch of the Three
Stooges and noting that the court is “concerned not with whether conventional celebrity images should
be produced but with who produces them and, more pertinently, who appropriates the value from their
production”); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296
S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) (applying the right of publicity to the sale of a bust of Martin Luther King,
Jr., and extending any valid reasons for recognizing the right to privacy during life to celebrities and
their families even after death).
172
See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1178 (describing current law as
embodying “a presumption that celebrities have an absolute right to the economic value of their
identity, subject only to special First Amendment concerns that will rarely apply in a merchandising
case”); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing
a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 67–69 (2004) (examining and critiquing the economic rationales that have been
offered to justify intellectual property rights in United States jurisprudence); Volokh, supra note 9, at
905 (arguing that typical definitions of the right of publicity “can’t be accepted at face value” because
they would block uses such as unauthorized biographies that have been protected by the First
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173

approach as inherently unlikely to give speech rights their due.
This Article attacks the free speech approach from the opposite end,
arguing that it fails to give property rights their due. Neither free speech
analysts, nor their traditional critics, fully confront the core question: is
publicity a legitimate form of property? Critics who believe that the right
of publicity is not a legitimate property interest do not understand why
publicity rights should ever trump speech rights.174 But if one accepts
publicity’s status as property—as many legislatures and courts do—then
speech rights should never limit the right of publicity. After all, a
homeowner is not required to make his front yard available to those who
want to use it to speak. Ultimately, the free speech approach simply begs
the question whether publicity is property.
A. The Standard Critique of Free Speech Principles To Limit Publicity
Rights
Many commentators have shown that attempts to identify particular
instances in which a right of publicity would violate the First Amendment
cannot be reconciled with free speech jurisprudence. Properly applied,
they maintain, First Amendment principles do not just limit the right of
publicity; they swallow it entirely.175 No existing First Amendment theory
adequately explains why the use of a celebrity’s identity to sell
automobiles, potato chips, or T-shirts violates the celebrity’s property
rights,176 but the use of celebrity identity to sell movies, lithographs, or
Amendment). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition limits the scope of the right of publicity,
excluding at least “ordinarily” from the scope of the right “the use of a person’s identity in news
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental
to such uses.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995). Some states, by statute,
adopt a similar limitation. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1(c) (LexisNexis 2002) (providing a
similarly broad exception); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.09 (LexisNexis 2008) (same); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8316(e) (West 2007) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.070(1) (West 2005)
(exempting any “matters of cultural, historical, political, religious, educational, newsworthy, or public
interest”). Other states carve out a narrower exemption. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West
1997) (“[I]n connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political
campaign . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449(D) (West 1993) (adopting the same limited
exclusion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1107(a) (2001) (same); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
540.08(3)(a) (West 2007) (excluding only “bona fide news report[s] or presentation[s] having a current
and legitimate public interest”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (2007) (excluding only news reports and
noncommercial advertisements); cf. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/35(b) (West 2009) (excluding a
broad range of portrayals of people, but covering uses of people’s names in songs or books that are
outside the scope of “portray[al], descri[ption], or impersonat[ion]”).
173
See supra Part III.A.1.
174
See supra Part III.A.1.
175
See Volokh, supra note 9, at 929 (“But, when applied to expression, ‘my property’ is another
way of saying ‘legally forbidden to be another’s speech.’”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the
Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL’Y 35, 53–54 (1998)
(“Publicity rights, in other words, are a kind of content-based regulation of speech.”).
176
See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the singer’s
claim was for “infringement of voice, not for infringement of a copyrightable subject such as a sound
recording or musical composition”); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)
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comic books does not.
As Shubha Ghosh states, “[t]he form of speech
protected under the First Amendment in right-of-publicity cases is a
mystery awaiting a solution.”178 Dogan and Lemley explain that attempts
to solve that mystery “inevitably lead[] courts to engage in content-based
analysis, favoring certain types of speech over others without any
compelling justification.”179 Assuming there is a way to balance speech
and property interests, judges are unqualified to do it.
B. An Alternative Critique of Free Speech Analysis
The concern that the right of publicity impinges free speech implicitly
rests on the assumption that publicity rights are not property rights. If one
accepts the conclusion of many legislatures and courts that publicity is
property, then the concern about free speech vanishes. But a new problem
emerges: why should the First Amendment limit the right of publicity at
all?180
The ability to speak freely is a privilege, an aspect of liberty that the
government may not deny, but that it has no obligation to foster. While an
individual can compel the government to ensure that individual’s ability to
exercise a right, the government cannot prevent private restraints on the
exercise of privileges.181 In contrast to speech, property ownership creates
(upholding a celebrity’s right of publicity when the celebrity’s singing style was used in an automobile
advertisement); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811 (upholding a right of publicity when celebrities were
depicted in a charcoal drawing on a T-shirt).
177
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying a right-ofpublicity claim when a celebrity’s image was used in prints of an original collage); Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying a similar claim where a celebrity’s name was used in a
movie title); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003) (denying a similar claim where a
celebrity’s identity was used in comic books).
178
Ghosh, Bobbling Heads, supra note 47, at 635.
179
Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1189.
180
Commentators have implicitly recognized this point. See id. at 1183 (“The labor and unjust
enrichment rationales also fail to explain uses that the law treats as beyond the celebrity’s control. If a
celebrity has a right to appropriate the full value of her persona and to prevent others from profiting
from the use of her name, that right logically would seem to extend to control over references in the
for-profit news media, documentaries, biographies, and a variety of other creative works to which the
right of publicity does not extend even today. A moral rights theory needs to be able to explain not just
why we grant certain rights, but also why we don’t grant others.”); Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
supra note 70, at 668 (“[O]nce the court has decided which label to attach to a dispute—free speech or
property—the outcome is by and large determined.”).
181
In a prior article, I explained Wesley Hohfeld’s seminal analysis of rights and privileges as
follows:
[L]awyers tend to use the term right to encompass at least two separate concepts: a
privilege, which is an individual entitlement with which the government may not
interfere; and a right, which is an individual entitlement to call upon the government
to stop others from doing something. Individuals have a privilege to engage in free
speech, and individuals have a right to exclude trespassers from their real property.
A privilege, then, is something that no other person has a right to call upon the
government to stop. If person A has a privilege to speak in a public forum, then
person B might be said to have a non-right to call upon the government to stop A
from speaking. The correlative legal entitlement to a right is a duty. If A has a right
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rights; an owner can both use property without government interference
and invoke the government’s authority to prevent others from trespassing
or otherwise appropriating his or her property.182 In this sense, private
property rights trump free speech privileges whenever they conflict. A
property owner may exclude anyone from using his property—real,
personal, or intellectual—as a figurative soapbox from which to engage in
speech, regardless of the subject matter of the intended speech. This
bright-line rule is applicable to all existing forms of property.183 The
property owner’s right to exclude others from using the property is
unaltered by a non-owner’s desire to use the property to speak. No
to exclude individuals from real property, then B has a duty to stay off of A’s
property unless invited.
Steven Semeraro, Sweet Land of Property?: The History, Symbols, Rhetoric, and Theory Behind the
Ordering of the Rights to Liberty and Property in the Constitutional Lexicon, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1, 55
(2008) (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–33 (1913)).
182
Id.
183
Examples involving real property tend to be the richest and most prominent in the case law.
These typically involve an owner of real property excluding a trespasser who wants to deliver a
message—even a purely political one—from that property. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485
(1988) (explaining that “[t]here simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling
listener” and that “we have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted
speech into their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom”). The Court has
extended this principle to property used for commercial purposes. See Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
568–69 (1972) (explaining that “this Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may
exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for
private purposes only” and that “property [does not] lose its private character merely because the public
is generally invited to use it for designated [commercial] purposes”). It has similarly extended the
principle to government-owned property not traditionally open for free speech purposes. See Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (“The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control
the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.”). The only exceptions have
been situations in which the owner controls property that bears the earmarks of public property on
which free speech generally is permitted, such as a company town, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
505–08 (1946), or, more controversially, a shopping center serving the purposes of a public town
square. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1980) (upholding a state law
requiring a shopping center owner to permit non-disruptive political speech); Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567–68
(suggesting in dicta that free speech and property rights may be subject to balancing in the shopping
center context). The Second Circuit has recognized that free speech rights do not trump property rights
in the context of a trademark dispute, explaining that because “plaintiff’s trade mark is in the nature of
a property right, . . . it need not ‘yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances
where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.’” Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567, and
recognizing that enjoining the use of a trademark is not a prior restraint on speech).
Examples with respect to other types of property include:
(1) The owner of personal property, such as a public address system, may
prohibit others from using that property to advocate their cause.
(2) The owner of a patent on a new method of amplification can similarly refuse
a license for speakers wishing to use the invention to better communicate their
messages.
(3) A copyright protects against the copying and distribution of original creative
works in tangible form, even when the copier seeks to use the work to advance core
political speech.
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balancing of speech and property rights is necessary.
First Amendment commentators may counter that speech interests do
play a role in defining the scope of copyright in a way that is similar to
defining the scope of the right of publicity. Copyright, they may argue,
limits the content that a speaker may employ, rather than the place or
manner of the speech. It thus includes a unique balancing mechanism to
determine whether a particular use of the content is fair.184 Because the
right of publicity also restrains the content of speech, some claim that it too
should incorporate a fair use exception.185
This purported distinction between copyright and the right of publicity,
on the one hand, and other forms of property, on the other, does not
withstand careful scrutiny. To the extent that copyright limits the content
of speech, other forms of property do so as well. The content of the
message that a speaker conveys is often as dependent on the location and
manner of the speech as it is on the specific words chosen. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]n espousal of socialism may carry
different implications when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion
than when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.”186
Nevertheless, prohibiting speakers from invading a homeowner’s property
rights against his or her will has survived First Amendment challenge.187
Similarly, broadcasting support for a ballot proposition by sound truck
communicates a distinctly different message than distributing handbills on
a street corner. Yet, courts have upheld the regulation of sound trucks
because property owners have the right to exclude speech from their
property, and they may thus adopt reasonable steps to prevent sound-truck
messages from invading their private space.188
184
Dogan and Lemley claim that copyright doctrine has not been adequately limited by free
speech concerns. See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1164 (“For better or worse,
copyright laws have gotten a free ride when it comes to the First Amendment.”). This approach
misconceives the distinction between property and the First Amendment.
185
See Risa J. Weaver, Online Fantasy Sports Litigation and the Need for a Federal Right of
Publicity Statute, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Feb. 9, 2010, at ¶¶ 44, 48–50 (urging the adoption of a fairuse exception to the right of publicity).
186
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56–57 (1994); see also id. at 56 (“Displaying a sign from
one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else,
or conveying the same text or picture by other means. . . . A sign advocating ‘Peace in the Gulf’ in the
front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than . . . the
same message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile.”).
187
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, 488 (upholding a ban on picketing an individual house, and noting
that, “even if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless
inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy”).
188
For this reason, the Court has rejected governmental attempts to bar particular means of
communication, such as hand-billing or door-to-door solicitation, while at the same time recognizing
that private property owners may prohibit precisely the same speech on their property. See id. at 486
(listing cases invaliding ordinances against marching, soliciting, and hand-billing, but reiterating that an
individual property owner may prohibit the speech on his property or invading his property rights);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (“While this Court, in enforcing the broad protection the
Constitution gives to the dissemination of ideas, has invalidated an ordinance forbidding a distributor
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Time, place, and manner limits, of course, are not as restrictive as
completely prohibiting someone from communicating an idea. But neither
copyright nor publicity rights bar all discourse on a particular topic.
Copyright cannot prevent a speaker from expressing particular ideas; it
reaches only the manner in which the copyright holder has expressed those
ideas.189 Nor can the right of publicity stop individuals from speaking
about celebrities. Although the law may block the sale of T-shirts
depicting a celebrity, it does not prohibit commentary through a fanzine or
blog. Just like other property rights, publicity rights merely limit the
manner in which the speech takes place.
In some cases, the right of publicity may prevent the most effective
means of communicating a message, such as advertising or merchandising.
The postcard of John Wayne wearing lipstick is an example of a powerful
message that was extinguished by the right of publicity.190 An academic
paper, however, could adequately address the same gender issues raised by
the image and even describe the offending postcard without affronting the
right of publicity. A paper would not communicate the intended message
as effectively as the postcard. But the Supreme Court has held only that
speakers have a right to adequate means of communication, not the most
effective possible means.191
As troubling as this restraint may be for a free speech advocate,
property rights regularly curtail a speaker’s potential effectiveness. Like
the John Wayne postcard image, a protest on the mayor’s lawn, a labor
picket line on the grounds of a shopping mall, or a political campaign’s use
of a sound truck may be the most effective means of communicating
certain messages, but real and personal property rights allow owners to
prohibit them,192 just as publicity rights enabled the owner of Wayne’s
persona to block the postcard’s sale.
All types of property rights sufficiently prevent speakers from using
the most effective means of communicating when the speaker exploits
of pamphlets or handbills from summoning householders to their doors to receive the distributor’s
writings, this was on the ground that the home owner could protect himself from such intrusion by an
appropriate sign ‘that he is unwilling to be disturbed.’ The Court never intimated that the visitor could
insert a foot in the door and insist on a hearing. We do not think that . . . [we must] expand this
interdiction of legislation to include ordinances against obtaining an audience for the broadcaster’s
ideas by way of sound trucks with loud and raucous noises on city streets.” (quoting Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 148 (1943))).
189
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (explaining that “a copyright gives no exclusive
right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself”).
190
Madow, supra note 2, at 144.
191
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, 488 (upholding a ban on picketing an individual house); Members
of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (holding that there is no
right to a particular means of communicating if “there are ample alternative modes of
communication”); Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (explaining that only “adequate
alternative avenues of communication” must remain open).
192
See supra notes 181–91 and accompanying text.
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another’s property rights. Property, however, does not exclude particular
viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas; it merely requires that such
viewpoints be presented without using someone else’s property.
Speech interests thus fail to serve as a basis for distinguishing the right
of publicity from other forms of property. The balancing approach never
engages the real issue whether publicity rights are property rights. Because
if they are, then the cases most vilified for upholding the right of publicity
become simple.
The speech interests of marketers of celebrity
paraphernalia become as irrelevant to publicity rights as the speech
interests of a sound-truck operator broadcasting from someone’s private
driveway. But those cases that truncate publicity rights on free speech
grounds—including some merchandising cases as well as the newsreporting and biography decisions—then appear unjustifiable because the
desire to speak does not limit the scope of property rights.193 Existing
judicial and academic literature fails to grapple with this problem.
VI. DISTINGUISHING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
THROUGH COMPETITION POLICY
Competition policy has been used to limit the scope of all types of
property. Its application in right-of-publicity cases, however, remains
largely unexplored.194 This Part examines how competition-policy analysis
could coherently limit publicity rights.
A. Defining Competition Policy
At both the federal and state levels, American law favors competition
193
Property rights that are so broad as to cut off all forms of speech would likely violate the
Constitution. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (holding that the owner of an entire
town could not prevent speech on what would traditionally be public property).
194
Although references to competition policy considerations in right-of-publicity case law are
rare, one court cited competition concerns in holding that the right of publicity should not extend
beyond the death of the celebrity. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959–60
(6th Cir. 1980). But see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding
that the right of publicity is inheritable); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. Am.
Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) (same). Judge Cornelia Kennedy also argued
that competition policy is relevant to the scope of the right of publicity in her dissent in Carson v.
Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. See 698 F.2d 831, 840 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“Protection under the right of publicity creates a common law monopoly that removes items, words
and acts from the public domain.”). Her use of competition policy, however, was really just free
speech analysis in disguise. She would have held that Johnny Carson’s right of publicity did not extend
to the use of “Here’s Johnny” in the name of a company, because doing so would “take[] this phrase
away from the public domain.” Id. at 840. This point, while relevant to free speech considerations, is
irrelevant from the perspective of competition policy, because a particular phrase is virtually never
essential to competition concerns and certainly was not necessary for the defendant there to compete
effectively in the portable toilet market. The scholarship largely ignores competition policy, though
Madow makes some oblique references to it. See Madow, supra note 2, at 130 (recognizing that the
right of publicity permits celebrities “to capture (and monopolize)” the merchandising and advertising
that makes use of their personas).
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195

over monopolistic ordering.
“‘The heart of our national economic
policy,’” the Supreme Court has explained, is a long-held faith “‘in the
value of competition’” and the belief that it constitutes “the best method of
allocating resources in a free market”196 and will “ultimately . . . produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”197
The Court has also recognized, but never clearly articulated, that to
achieve these goals competition is required only when rivalry will
efficiently lower costs, increase quality, and stimulate efficient resource
allocation.198 Were competition required at all times and in every
dimension, chaotic uncertainty would lead to the inefficient use of
resources. The law must therefore enable firms that succeed in the
competitive marketplace to secure their gains. It does this by recognizing
property rights that insulate firms from certain types of competition.
Both the general antitrust laws and industry-specific competition-based
regulatory programs are designed to balance the duty to compete and the
right to property.199 Traditionally, competition policy regulation required
natural monopoly200 utilities—like gas, electric, and telephone
companies—to provide service at reasonable rates on non-discriminatory
terms.201 The antitrust laws were believed to be ineffectual for industries
like these that could not efficiently support more than one supplier.202

195
See FCC v. RCA Commc’ns, 346 U.S. 86, 89 (1953) (referring to the “national policy in favor
of competition” and concluding that “competition is in the public interest where competition is
reasonably feasible” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
196
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
197
Id.; see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (describing the
antitrust laws as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” which are “as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms”).
198
See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (explaining that the
antitrust laws do not prohibit all conduct that restrains competition, because restraint in one dimension
may “promote[] competition” in another); see also id. at 237–38 (recognizing that the Court will
uphold a regulation that “merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition”).
199
The federal antitrust laws, for example, are principally Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
which govern anticompetitive agreements in restraint of trade and unilateral conduct in restraint of
trade, respectively, Sherman Act, ch. 647 §§ 1–2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–2 (2006)), and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which protects against anticompetitive mergers and
acquisitions, Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(2006)). Many states have similar laws that generally track the scope of the federal antitrust laws. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER § 3, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div_stats/211491.pdf.
200
A natural monopoly is a market that will efficiently support only one competitor. For
example, electric power distribution requires the construction of an elaborate wired network. Creating
duplicate networks to permit competition would inefficiently increase overall costs to consumers.
Electric utilities distributing power are thus viewed as natural monopolies.
201
See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1104–05
(1940).
202
See Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation: A New Focus for a Competitive Energy
Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79, 79–80 (2000) (explaining that Congress chose regulation over antitrust in
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More recently, regulatory schemes have sought to create competition in
what were once thought to be natural monopoly industries. These
competition policy programs impose competitive duties that have been
described as “more ambitious than the antitrust laws.”203
Together, these laws constitute a broad competition policy designed to
ensure that competitive threats stimulate innovation and efficient
production, while permitting firms to retain sufficient profit to ensure
adequate risk-taking.204 The precise mixture of these components is
neither consistent nor precisely articulated.205 As the Supreme Court has
explained, “[w]hat is required . . . is an enquiry meet for the case, looking
to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”206
In established markets where the risk of loss is minimal, antitrust laws
encourage copying a competitor’s products, ensuring a constant threat of
direct price and quality competition.207 The ability to exploit a new
product or service during the time that it takes competitors to market
copies is thought to provide sufficient profit to stimulate efficient
innovation.208
In markets where risk is more substantial, the profits made possible
simply by being the first to innovate are deemed inadequate. The law thus
prohibits copying for periods of time or in particular contexts—by
recognizing property rights—and thereby lessening competition in order to
provide greater incentives to bear the risk of innovating. The patent
system, for example, prohibits copying for twenty years, blunting the direct
price competition on or incremental improvements to the patented product
industries such as electric power and natural gas distribution because these industries “were generally
perceived as natural monopolies, because they can be provided more efficiently by one supplier”).
203
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004)
[hereinafter Verizon I].
204
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (“This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely for
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring
about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a
corporation engaged in commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual
carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions
thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the
effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition.”).
205
Justice Breyer articulated the relevant issues in some detail in his dissent in Verizon v. FCC.
See 535 U.S. 467, 549–52 (2002) [hereinafter Verizon II] (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (explaining that the ability to immediately copy a competitive input would render competition
impossible because there would be no way to recoup sufficient profit to justify the risk of developing
new inputs); see also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition
in Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 124–25 (1998) (“If deprived of a return to capital
facilities after capital has been sunk in irreversible investments, or if faced with reduced returns to
investments already made, any economically rational company will eliminate or reduce similar capital
investments in the future.”).
206
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
207
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
208
Cf. Verizon II, 535 U.S. at 505–06 (explaining that even where access to a competitor’s
property is compelled by regulation, the delay between implementation and competitive use can be
sufficient to stimulate innovation).
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209

or process that would result absent patent protection. Nonetheless, some
competitive threats remain. A patent holder continues to face the threat of
a competitive innovator obtaining a patent first or developing a more
efficient, non-infringing technology.210
In other markets, a single firm or a small group of large competitors
dominate, and no ongoing competitive threat exists. Here, competition
policy requires affirmative conduct by the dominant firms to create a
sufficient competitive threat. Examples include regulatory programs that
(1) stimulated competition in the market to generate electric power while
continuing to regulate monopoly-power distributors,211 and (2) compelled
landline telephone service providers to share the last mile of wiring with
competitors.212 In antitrust cases, the courts have imposed similar
obligations on dominant firms.213

209
See Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene
Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 207–08 (2007) (explaining that the patent system blunts price and
incremental improvement competition).
210
Shubha Ghosh has made similar arguments, though explaining the channeling of competition
in a somewhat different way, in advancing his theory that intellectual property should be viewed as a
form of regulation. See Shubha Ghosh, Carte Blanche, Quanta, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L.
1209, 1216 (2009) [hereinafter Ghosh, Carte Blanche] (contending that “intellectual property and
antitrust can be understood more clearly as a disagreement over what norm of competition is
appropriate in the marketplace”).
211
An example of competition-policy-driven electric-power utility regulation at the federal level
is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which sought to create competition in
electric-power generation. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006); see also id. §§ 796(14), 824a-3(e)(1) (directing the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (then the “Federal Power Commission”) to prescribe
implementing rules). The Act’s legislative history recognized that:
[T]wo problems impeded the development of nontraditional generating facilities: (1)
traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell
power to, the nontraditional facilities, and (2) the regulation of these alternative
energy sources by state and federal utility authorities imposed financial burdens
upon the nontraditional facilities and thus discouraged their development.
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750–51 (1982) (footnote omitted).
212
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposed a number of specific duties on local telephone
providers, requiring that they permit competitors to use their assets. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)–(5)
(2006) (imposing a duty to (1) interconnect with potential competitors; (2) provide unbundled access to
elements of the “incumbent local exchange carrier[’s]” (ILEC’s) own network; (3) offer for resale at
wholesale rates any service that the ILEC provides to its customers; and (4) notify other carriers of
changes to the network that would affect interoperability with other networks); Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,508–09 (1996) (noting that the Act “mandat[es] that the most significant economic
impediments to efficient entry into the monopolized local market . . . be removed”).
213
See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 587, 595, 598 &
n.23, 599, 610–11 (1985) (upholding a judgment requiring ski areas to sell slope tickets permitting
customers to ski at competing areas); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45–46, 106–07,
118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Microsoft I] (suggesting that Microsoft could be subject to
injunctive relief if the lower court reached certain conclusions, but reversing and remanding the
particular remedy imposed).
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B. The Interaction Between Competition Policy and Property Rights
American competition and property law are inextricably intertwined.214
The scope of a property right is simply the extent to which immediate
competition is proscribed to make way for sufficient return needed to
stimulate innovation. And the scope of a competition duty is bounded by
property rights that insulate firms from particular types of competition.
This relationship between property and competition has received
surprisingly little attention from academic commentators.215 Duncan
Kennedy and Frank Michelman’s seminal article, Are Property and
Contract Efficient?, is the principal exception. The authors explain that
American law has never recognized absolute property rights; if it did,
“[c]ompetition [would be] impossible because it presupposes two actors
each of whom is privileged to inflict on the other the injury of loss of trade
or of some other advantage” that reduces the value of the competitor’s
property.216 Kennedy and Michelman state that individuals have a
“universal privilege to act . . . competitively . . . despite adverse
consequences for another’s enjoyment of his things.”217 Furthermore,
“[n]either competitor has a right symmetrical to this privilege, since neither
can sue the other for the loss of the customer (or other advantage) that he is
perfectly free to take if he can.”218 Competition policy thus limits property
rights to the degree necessary to make socially beneficial competition
possible.219
One way of understanding the property-competition relationship is to
view competition as de-propertizing certain assets in order to create a
competitive threat sufficient to stimulate efficient behavior, despite
reducing the value of some property.220 In most cases, business owners
214
See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 84, at 763 (explaining that a system of pure, universal
private property rights would not permit injuries to property flowing from competitive activity, and
thus property rights necessarily must be shaped so as to account for competition policy).
215
Shubha Ghosh has explored the relationship between property rights and competition in the
context of intellectual property law. See Ghosh, Carte Blanche, supra note 210, at 1210 (“[I]ntellectual
property doctrine is informed by norms of competition.”). This Article contends that this relationship
extends to all forms of property.
216
Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 84, at 763.
217
Id. at 769.
218
Id. at 763.
219
It is important not to overstate this point. In many instances, limiting competition in one
dimension will be socially beneficial because it increases competition in another dimension. Patent law
constitutes a quintessential example. Limiting short-run competition in a patented technology
stimulates longer-run competition to develop new and better technologies. In certain situations,
however, the standard calculus may not apply. For example, when dealing with a market that is best
served by a single standardized technology, granting patent holders the usual scope of property
protection may not be socially beneficial. Requiring licensing on reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms may, for example, better balance the property and competition policy interests. See infra Part
VI.C.2 for a discussion of the balancing of property and competition policy interests in the context of
public utilities regulation.
220
The following scenario illustrates the distinction between the impact of free speech rights and
competition policy on property rights. Competitors A and B compete to publish books of great social

2011]

WHY COMPETITION POLICY SHOULD LIMIT THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

797

cannot prevent competitors from enticing their customers to switch
suppliers.221 This is because American society has chosen to limit the
scope of property to accommodate this form of competition. The value of
an immediate competitive threat outweighs the social value of permitting a
firm to lock in profits by prohibiting a competitor from enticing an existing
customer to switch suppliers.
One could imagine a regime in which competition is even more highly
valued. A legal system might prohibit a property owner from refusing to
share an asset whenever a competitor could not readily duplicate it. In
such a regime, patent protection for inventors would be narrower than
under current law because patent holders would be compelled to license a
patent whenever a competitive technology did not exist.222 Other property
rights, too, would be narrower. For example, if Competitor A had a factory
operating at less than full capacity, Competitor A could be compelled to
allow Competitor B to use the real and personal property embodied in the
factory.223
These examples illustrate that American law has adopted property
rights and competition policy regimes that authorize a property owner to
call upon the government to prohibit competition in some realms, but not
others. A firm is guaranteed the exclusive use of its patents and real
property, but not the continuity of its customer.224 Although a factory
and monetary value. Competitor A owns a printing press of the finest quality, and Competitor B, who
owns only a pedestrian press, needs one of a very fine quality in order to create a masterwork that will
better the lives of millions throughout the world. Access to Competitor A’s printing press would enable
Competitor B to publish this masterwork sooner and at less expense, compensating the author more
generously and resulting in a lower price to book buyers. Despite the interests of the public generally
and the free speech interests of both the author and Competitor B, property law would permit
Competitor A to refuse to allow Competitor B to use its printing press as long as other high-quality
presses are available for purchase or lease in the marketplace. Recognizing a strong right to exclude
may increase Competitor B’s costs somewhat, but Competitor A has no market power. Property law
simply allows Competitor A to capture the value of its press either by retaining it for its own future use
or by licensing it. If, however, Competitor A’s printing press was the only high-quality press within the
geographic area in which competition was feasible, competition policy might compel Competitor A to
share the press with Competitor B.
221
See Keeble v. Hickeringill, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B.) 1128 (providing an early
articulation of the principle that reducing the value of property through legitimate competition does not
violate the owner’s property right). There, the plaintiff set up a duck decoy pond. The court explained
that reducing the value of one’s property by “a violent or malicious act”—scaring away the ducks with
a gun—creates a cause of action for violating the owner’s property right, “[b]ut if a man doth him
damage by using the same employment; as if Mr. Hickeringill had set up another decoy on his own
ground near the plaintiff’s, and that had spoiled the custom of the plaintiff, no action would lie.” Id. at
1127–28.
222
One could also imagine a legal regime in which property rights received greater protection.
Patents, for example, could have 100-year terms.
223
Such a regime may not be as far-fetched as one might at first assume.
The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 effectively required local telephone companies to share underutilized
facilities with competitors to facilitate competition. See supra note 212.
224
This approach to property may well reflect the influences of Lockean theory, but not in the
way in which Locke is typically read. Those who view Locke as a property absolutist on moral
grounds ignore his reference to the river from which all can take a drink so long as sufficient water
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owner, for example, can seek government enforcement of her right to
exclude others from using her patents or factory, competitors can develop
their own patents or build new factories that devalue the original owner’s
property through competition.225
C. Competition-Property Interaction in Specific Cases
This understanding of the relationship between property and
competition is controversial. The alternative views property law as
entirely self-contained and self-defining.
Within this paradigm,
competition begins at property’s natural end. In a 2001 speech, a former
commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission, Mary Azcuenaga,
articulated this alternative view: “[Y]ou could actually know everything
you need to know about antitrust and intellectual property,” she declared,
“by remembering” that if the IP-holder properly obtained the right and did
not improperly attempt to expand it, “then there should be no need to apply
antitrust law.”226
This view, though widely held, ignores a century of case law and
legislation that conclusively establish that where a property owner actually
has the ability to completely avoid the competitive threats necessary to
ensure efficient marketplace behavior, competition policy requires the
sharing of what is ordinarily viewed as private property.227 To be sure,
flow exists for others to partake. 2 LOCKE, supra note 110, § 33. This passage is generally interpreted
to set up a distinction between common property that is free to all and private property from which
individuals can be excluded unless they pay a license fee. Cf. Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
supra note 70, at 668 (distinguishing “categor[ies] of ‘free’ to ‘owned’” speech). But this distinction is
artificial. Obtaining any form of property requires some effort, and expending that effort has an
opportunity cost. So, nothing is free. There are only different prices for different pieces of property;
there is no common and private. The difference is a matter of degree. Applying Locke’s drinking from
the river example to all property may mean that one can exclude others from particular property only if
other reasonably comparable property is available.
225
This general balance, permitting exclusive use, but not protecting value from competition, is
not invariable. Some forms of competition—such as pawning off another’s goods as your own—are
deemed unfair, and thus are not permitted. Lanham (Trade-Mark) Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2006), declared unconstitutional in part by Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
226
Azcuenaga, supra note 15, at 11. The Federal Circuit has also adopted this view, holding that
a patent owner . . . is exempt from the antitrust laws, even though [an infringement]
suit may have an anticompetitive effect, unless . . . the asserted patent was obtained
through knowing and willful fraud . . . . Or he may demonstrate that the
infringement suit was a mere sham to cover what is actually no more than an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.
In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Glass Equip.
Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
227
The purpose of this Article is to explore how competition policy may act as a limit on a
particular property right, the right of publicity. It is worth noting, however, that examples exist in
American law in which quasi-property rights may prevent what is ordinarily viewed as legitimate
competition. Cases of interference with contractual relations, and the prohibition of certain forms of
competition in conjunction with the sale of goodwill even absent a covenant not to compete provide
two examples. See, e.g., Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 1286, 1290–91 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing “‘an unlawful interference with a person in the
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these cases are unusual. But that is not because of some sacrosanct
understanding of property’s natural scope or the moral compulsion to
honor a right to exclude. Rather, these cases are uncommon precisely
because property rights rarely create significant market power. And when
they do, consumers usually benefit more from enforcing property rights,
and thus stimulating competition to obtain those rights, than consumers
would benefit from reducing property’s scope and thereby encouraging
copying and incremental improvements.228 Strong property protection
generally encourages competitors to develop new means to compete, and
the threat of new and better innovations is sufficient to ensure efficient
behavior.229 Enforcing a drug patent, for example, provides a strong
incentive for other companies to patent competitive drugs, and that threat
ensures that the original patent holder must continue to innovate.
In the rare cases in which a property right would significantly restrain
beneficial competition, however, American law bends property to the
dictates of competition.230 The following subsections provide examples of
representative situations for each type of property: real, personal, and
intellectual.
1. Real Property
With respect to real property, alternative comparable property is
almost always available for competitors, and thus examples of competition
policy restricting real property rights are extremely rare. But they are not
unheard of. Where substitute assets cannot reasonably be found, and thus
the real property owner would have significant, durable market power,
antitrust law has been held to create a duty to deal231 that reconfigures the
property-competition balance to the extent necessary to allow marketplace
forces to govern the provision of goods and services.232
performance of his contract with a third party’ is ‘a legal wrong,’ and the tort ‘extends to cases in
which performance of the contract is rendered more difficult or a party’s enjoyment of the contract’s
benefits is lessened by the wrongdoer’s actions’” (quoting Goodall v. Columbia Ventures, Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 1324, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1974))); Sager Spuck Statewide Supply Co. v. Meyer, 710 N.Y.S.2d 429,
432 (App. Div. 2000) (recognizing the implied covenant not to impair the value of goodwill by directly
soliciting the former customers of a business that is sold).
228
See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563, 566–70 (9th Cir. 1968) (suggesting that
consumers benefit when given the ability to choose from among competitive products).
229
The Sherman and Clayton Acts, as discussed previously, reflect this understanding. See supra
notes 199–206 and accompanying text.
230
See infra Part VI.C.3.
231
See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) (explaining
that “[t]here are . . . limited circumstances in which a firm’s unilateral refusal to deal with its rivals can
give rise to antitrust liability” (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
608–11 (1985))).
232
Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced Sharing: An Examination of the
Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 57, 76–91 (2003). This understanding of property may have
antecedents in Locke, who recognized that anyone may drink from a common river so long as there is
enough water of the same quality left for the “unprovided.” 2 LOCKE, supra note 110, § 33.

800

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:753

The Supreme Court first recognized that the antitrust laws can operate
to limit property rights in a case involving ownership of the only means of
rail access to St. Louis, Missouri.233 Ordinarily, the Court recognized, the
antitrust laws do not “‘destroy[] rights of property.’”234 “[I]n ordinary
circumstances,” Justice Lurton explained, “a number of independent
companies might combine [to] . . . control[] . . . terminals for their common
but exclusive use. In such cases other companies might be admitted upon
terms or excluded altogether. If such terms were too onerous, there would
ordinarily remain the right and power to construct their own terminals.”235
But “the situation at St. Louis,” the Court recognized, was “most
extraordinary.”236 As a “result of the geographical and topographical
situation,” no railroad, “as a practical matter,” could “even enter St.
Louis . . . without using the facilities entirely controlled by the Terminal
Company.”237 Because the unusual circumstances made competition
impossible under the general scheme of property rights, those rights had to
give way, and the Court required the owners to share the terminal.238
A more recent example involved the ownership of ski mountains in
Aspen, Colorado.239 Because of the geography and land use regulations,
only four mountains were available for skiing.240 Aspen Ski Corporation,
the owner of three of those four mountains, thus had what the Court
assumed to be durable market power in the skiing services market.241
Because of that power, the antitrust laws required it to effectively share its
mountains with its competitor, Aspen Highlands, forcing it to offer a ski
pass that permitted skiers to enjoy either of the two competitors’
facilities.242
2. Personal Property
Perhaps the most well-known cases in which the courts have
interpreted antitrust law to require competitors to share assets involve the
personal property of public utilities. During the early and mid-twentieth
century, a single private telephone company, AT&T, came to own an
extremely large percentage of the wiring system interconnecting telephone
233

United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 391–94 (1912).
See id. at 409 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911)).
235
Id. at 405.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 397.
238
Id. at 411–12.
239
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
240
See id. at 587–89 (observing that “[t]he development of any major additional facilities [was]
hindered by practical considerations and regulatory obstacles,” and the county government had recently
followed a policy of limiting growth).
241
Id. at 587–89, 593–96, 610–11.
242
See id. at 610–11 (finding that “the record in this case comfortably supports an inference that
the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers from doing business with its
smaller rival,” and that it “was not motivated by efficiency concerns”).
234
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243

users.
In the 1970s, competitors emerged for AT&T’s long-distance
transmission lines, but they could not economically duplicate the so-called
last mile of wire to individual homes.244 Oversimplifying a bit, if AT&T
were permitted to exclude all others from the use of these lines,
competition in the provision of telephone service would have been
impossible. AT&T could have displaced market forces and dictated the
terms on which telephone service was provided. To blunt that market
power, the courts interpreted antitrust law to require AT&T to interconnect
with its competitors so that they could use AT&T’s last mile of wiring to
compete to provide long-distance service.245
A decade later, Congress enacted a new regulatory program that
compelled local telephone providers to share the last mile of wiring, and
any other asset that could not be readily duplicated by a competitor, to
facilitate competition in local telephone service.246 Although displacing
property rights to a greater extent than the antitrust laws do,247 this
regulatory program nonetheless demonstrates competition policy’s role in
limiting the scope of property rights in the unusual case in which those
rights create market power that would harm consumers.
The Supreme Court reached a similar decision with respect to electricpower transmission.248 Because more than one provider could not feasibly
serve each town, meaningful competition to be the sole service provider
was the only form of competition.249 Although municipalities were
potential competitors for large electric utilities, the Court recognized that
“[p]roposed municipal systems have great obstacles; they must purchase
the electric power at wholesale. To do so they must have access to existing
transmission lines.”250 Ordinarily, a transmission provider would be free to
withhold its personal property—the transmission lines—altogether, or
charge any price that it desired.251 Because “[t]he only ones available
belong[ed] to” the large utility serving the area,252 and installing a second
set of transmission lines would have been inefficient, the Court upheld a
243

MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1093–94 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1095–99.
245
Id. at 1146–50.
246
See supra note 212.
247
In reviewing an antitrust challenge based upon a telephone company’s failure to comply with
its regulatory requirements, the Supreme Court held that no antitrust duty to deal compels local
telephone providers to share their assets. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004).
248
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373–77 (1973), aff’d, 417 U.S. 901
(1974).
249
Id. at 369–70.
250
Id. at 370.
251
See id. at 387–88 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the appellant power company “asserted
a legitimate business interest in keeping its lines free for its own power sales and in refusing to lend a
hand in its own demise by wheeling cheaper power from” a potential competitor).
252
Id. at 370 (majority opinion).
244
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decree prohibiting the utility from “‘[r]efusing to sell electric power at
wholesale to existing or proposed municipal electric power systems . . . in
[its service area]’ and from refusing to wheel electric power over its
transmission lines from other electric power lines to such cities and
towns.”253
Just as the right to exclude is sometimes overridden to serve
competition policy interests, so is the right to sell. Companies seeking to
merge are routinely required to sell certain assets in order to ensure that the
merger does not lead to anticompetitive activity.254 In some cases, firms
have also been required to divest assets as a remedy for the anticompetitive
exercise of market power outside of the merger context. Most famously,
the breakup of AT&T required divestiture of both local telephone
providers and equipment and research companies,255 and the initial decree
in the Microsoft case included a provision requiring the company to divest
its applications business.256
3. Intellectual Property
Like real and personal property, intellectual property rights usually do
not convey significant market power on their owners,257 although they do
much more often than real property. For this reason, we see more explicit
references to competition policy limits on the scope of intellectual property
rights.258 This subsection provides examples, and then responds to the
253

Id. at 375, 381–82 (alteration in original).
See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 280–81 (1990) (“[I]n [g]overnment actions
divestiture is the preferred remedy for an illegal merger or acquisition.”). In a recent policy statement,
the Antitrust Division confirmed that divesture remedies are preferred. ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 7–9 (2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf.
255
See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226–34 (D.D.C. 1982) (modifying
a final judgment to include divestiture provisions), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S.
1001 (1983).
256
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Not later than
four months after entry of this Final Judgment, Microsoft shall submit to the Court and the Plaintiffs a
proposed plan of divestiture.”), vacated by 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This aspect of the decree was
reversed on non-substantive grounds. See Microsoft I, 253 F.3d at 107 (“[W]e vacate the District
Court’s remedies decree for three reasons. First, the District Court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing
despite the presence of remedies-specific factual disputes. Second, the court did not provide adequate
reasons for its decreed remedies. Finally, we have drastically altered the scope of Microsoft’s liability,
and it is for the District Court in the first instance to determine the propriety of a specific remedy for
the limited ground of liability which we have upheld.”).
257
See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 4.2 (Supp. 2004) (“The intellectual property
laws do not purport to confer any monopoly, however, but only the right to exclude others from
producing the good, expression or symbol covered by the intellectual property interest.”).
258
For example, the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft I declared that “‘[i]ntellectual property rights do not
confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.’” Microsoft I, 253 F.3d at 63 (quoting In re Indep. Serv.
Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division, and the Federal Trade Commission have jointly issued guidelines with respect to the
competition policy limits that the antitrust laws place on intellectual property owners. U.S. DEP’T OF
254
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Federal Circuit’s apparently contrary view that the scope of property rights
is entirely self-defining, uninfluenced by competition policy.
a. Patent and Copyright
Patent rights have long been riddled with limits designed to serve
competitive ends.259 A patent owner, for example, may not use its property
rights in an invention to compel a competitor to pay royalties (1) based on
the sale of other products,260 or (2) after the expiration of the patent.261 Nor
can the holder control the use of a patented product after it is sold.262 Both
rules were intended to limit the ability of a patent holder to blunt
competition. An exception to a patent holder’s right to exclude also
applies where a competitor uses the patented technology for scientific
research.263 This limitation, too, is motivated by the notion that
competition in scientific research will serve the public more effectively
than would a robust property right that restrained competition to advance
scientific learning.264
Similarly, a copyright owner cannot justify anticompetitive licensing
practices on the ground that it has the unfettered right to protect its
property interest.265 For example, the D.C. Circuit flatly rejected
Microsoft’s argument that “‘[i]f intellectual property rights have been
lawfully acquired,’” then “‘their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to
antitrust liability.’”266 Just as an owner is not free to make “use of one’s
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
259
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the patent system is one in which uniform
federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964).
260
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135–36 (1969), rev’d on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 321 (1971). For example, the patent holder may not “garner as royalties a
percentage share of the licensee’s receipts from sales of other products.” Id. at 136; see also United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948) (“Patents grant no privilege to their owners of
organizing the use of those patents to monopolize an industry through price control, through royalties
for the patents drawn from patent-free industry products and through regulation of distribution.”).
261
See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) (holding that requiring the payment of
royalties beyond the expiration of the patent is unlawful per se).
262
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 636–38 (2008); see also Ghosh, Carte
Blanche, supra note 210, at 1233 (explaining that “[t]he first sale doctrine should not be understood as
a limitation on rights, but as an essential legal doctrine for the construction of competitive markets
driven by intellectual property”).
263
See supra note 155.
264
For the observation that American law favors competition, in part, out of the belief that
competition encourages the development of better goods and services, see supra notes 195–97 and
accompanying text.
265
See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) (observing that the “mere presence
of competing substitutes” does not “destroy” a copyrighted product’s distinctiveness and rarely can
justify anticompetitive tying arrangements (citations omitted)), overruled in part by Ill. Tool Works,
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (disagreeing with the claim that the defendant had “an absolute and unfettered right to use its
intellectual property as it wishe[d]”).
266
Microsoft I, 253 F.3d at 63 (alteration in original).
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personal property, such as a baseball bat,” to inflict personal injury, the en
banc court observed, a company may not use intellectual property to inflict
competitive injury.267
b. Trademark
In defining the scope of trademark rights, the courts have also looked
to competition policy. The value of trademarks, like most forms of
property, is largely attributable to the hard work and investments of their
owners.268 As a result, some courts and commentators assume that the law
should reward the creator of that value by granting it exclusive control of
the trademark’s use.269 Others, however, have argued persuasively that the
interests protected by competition policy counsel strongly against
exclusive control of trademarks.270
267

Id.
See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 463 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right]
(explaining but not agreeing with this view); see also Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1014 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Through extensive use, plaintiffs have
acquired a property right in their marks which extends to the reproduction and sale of those marks . . . .
What plaintiffs have acquired by use, the substantive law of trademarks . . . will protect against
infringement. There is no overriding policy of free competition which would remove plaintiffs . . .
from the protective ambits of the Lanham Act.”); id. at 1013 (holding that a disclaimer of sponsorship
would be per se inadequate to avoid infringement, in that “[o]nly a prohibition of the unauthorized use
will sufficiently remedy the wrong”).
269
Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 268, at 463; see also Smith v. Chanel,
Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (explaining that “[d]isapproval of” a competitor’s use of
another’s trademark “may be an understandable first reaction, ‘[b]ut this initial response to the problem
has been curbed in deference to the greater public good’” (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Safety
Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959))).
270
See, e.g., Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d
1079, 1083 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (“‘In effect, the courts have allowed the public interest in being able to
purchase competing articles with the same useful features to override the producer’s right to protect the
goodwill its product has generated.’” (quoting Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional
Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77,
80 n.27 (1982))); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980)
(criticizing the Fifth Circuit for “bestowing broad property rights on trademark owners” when the
“trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion as to
who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark’s owner’s goods” (citing 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 2:6–7 (1973))); see also Medic
Alert Found. U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 933, 934–35, 938–39 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (finding
little evidence of trademark infringement, and finding a minimal likelihood of consumer confusion,
where the defendant included in its graphics software an image similar to the plaintiff’s logo); Bd. of
Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (observing that
“similarity or even identity of marks is not sufficient to establish confusion where non-competitive
goods are involved,” and rejecting the claim that “intent to capitalize on popularity is sufficient to
establish infringement”); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 464, 465–66, 469
(W.D. Pa. 1982) (finding for a manufacturer of soft goods in a case where a university alleged that the
manufacturer, in including the university’s insignia on its products, had engaged in trademark
infringement and unfair competition with the university), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 686 F.2d 1040 (3d
Cir. 1982); Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 268, at 472–78, 481–84 (suggesting
that the licensing market for trademark merchandise has a shaky foundation, and arguing that, while
trademark owners should be allowed to prevent a restricted range of merchandising uses that are likely
to confuse consumers, a broad merchandising right would have detrimental effects).
268
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For the purposes of this Article, the winner of this debate is less
important than that the debate occurs. In defining trademark rights, courts
unquestionably consult competition policy. For example, in Societe
Comptoir de L’Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v.
Alexander’s Department Stores, Inc.,271 the Second Circuit held that a
lesser-known competitor could use the valuable Christian Dior trademark
to advertise that its dresses were copies of the Dior designs.272 In rejecting
an infringement claim, the court explained that it was called upon to
resolve “a conflict of values which necessarily arises in an economy
characterized by competition and private property.”273 Trademark holders,
not surprisingly, sought to use trademark “to create a shield against
competition.”274 As the Second Circuit explained, however, “[t]he interest
of the consumer here in competitive prices of garments using Dior designs
without deception as to origin, is at least as great as the interest of plaintiffs
in monopolizing the name.”275
In a similar case in the Ninth Circuit, a copycat perfume manufacturer
advertised that its product smelled exactly like Chanel No. 5, thereby
exploiting the considerable investment that the originator had made in that
famous mark.276 In seeking an injunction, Chanel argued that trademark
law prevented this free riding to protect the “consumer good will created
through extensive, skillful, and costly advertising.”277 The court disagreed,
explaining that trademark protection is limited to uses that mislead
consumers about the source of the product “for reasons grounded in the
public policy favoring a free, competitive economy.”278 By guarding
against confusion as to the source of a good, trademark law increases
consumer information and thus stimulates competition.279 Extending
trademark law to reward the value that the mark has acquired, however,
“would create serious anti-competitive consequences with little
compensating public benefit.”280 In a legal regime that values competition,
the Ninth Circuit concluded, property rights are not sufficiently robust to
enable an owner “to monopolize the public’s desire for the unpatented
271

299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968).
277
Id. at 566; see also id. at 568 (explaining that the plaintiff argued that a “competitor should not
be permitted to ‘take a free ride’ on the trademark owner’s ‘widespread goodwill and reputation’”
(quoting Chanel, Inc. v. Smith, 151 U.S.P.Q. 685, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1966))).
278
Id. at 566.
279
Id.; see also id. at 568–69 (“By taking his ‘free ride,’ the copyist, albeit unintentionally, serves
an important public interest by offering comparable goods at lower prices. On the other hand, the
trademark owner, perhaps equally without design, sacrifices public to personal interests by seeking
immunity from the rigors of competition.”).
280
Id. at 566.
272
273
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product, even though [the owner itself] created that desire at great effort
and expense.”281
c. Non-Statutory Intellectual Property Rights
On at least one occasion, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized an
intellectual property right that fell outside of the traditional areas of patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secret,282 and in other cases federal courts
have considered, without recognizing, similar non-statutory rights.283 In
these cases, too, the courts look to competition policy as a key ingredient
in determining the property right’s scope.
In recognizing a limited property right in hot news, Justice Pitney, for
a majority of the Supreme Court in International News Service v.
Associated Press (“INS”), emphasized that permitting a news service to
compete by copying another service’s stories and republishing them while
they were still hot would be “unfair competition in business” given the
“peculiar value of news” and the importance of newsgathering to the
public.284 In the majority’s view, if property rights did not prohibit the
copying and republication of hot news, the cost of newsgathering would
likely be “prohibitive in comparison with the return.”285 This rationale fits
squarely within the framework set out in this section. That is, property
rights exist to ensure sufficient return to incentivize firms to compete.
Writing in dissent, Justice Brandeis disagreed with the result, but not
with the need to balance property and competition interests.286 For
Brandeis, “competition is not unfair in a legal sense, merely because the
profits gained are unearned, even if made at the expense of a rival.”287
Trusting that Congress would create the appropriate property right if the
news industry were truly threatened, he saw no need for the Court to
recognize a property right in hot news.288
281

Id. at 566, 568.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
283
See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845–46 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that basketball games do not fall within federal copyright protection because they do not
constitute “‘original works of authorship’”); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 279–81
(2d Cir. 1929) (refusing to create a common-law copyright for the plaintiff’s non-copyrighted silk
designs); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103, 1105–09 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that
a celebrity photograph archivist could state a claim for misappropriation against a website owner who
posted some of the archivist’s images).
284
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 235; see id. at 240 (“[INS’s] process [of copying AP stories for
republication] amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant’s
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material
portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with special advantage to
defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of
gathering the news. The transaction speaks for itself, and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in
characterizing it as unfair competition in business.”).
285
Id. at 241.
286
Id. at 259–61 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
287
Id. at 259.
288
Id. at 264–67.
282
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Based on similar considerations, Judge Learned Hand adopted a very
limited reading of INS in a subsequent case seeking property protection for
popular dress designs, which, like news, had a relatively short period
during which they were valuable.289 For the Second Circuit, Hand wrote
that property rights should not extend beyond the actual dresses themselves
“to prevent any imitation” that would effectively “set up a monopoly” over
the sale of dresses with particular designs.290
More recently, Judge Ralph Winter relied on competition policy to
deny the National Basketball Association’s claim that it held property
rights in the outcome and statistics of NBA games.291 Writing for the
Second Circuit, he concluded that the non-statutory property right
recognized in INS was limited to situations in which the copier did not
engage in meaningful competition with the originator.292 There, INS did
not meaningfully compete with AP when it simply copied and republished
a story.293 By contrast, where “one produces a product that is cheaper or
otherwise superior to the other,” and because of that business acumen
“prevail[s] in the marketplace,” a non-statutory property right stifling the
competition would be inappropriate.294
As with the discussion of trademark rights above, the point here is not
that particular non-statutory rights should, or should not, exist. That courts
use competition policy principles in making these decisions, however,
conclusively establishes that the social benefits of competition have played
a critical role in defining property’s end.
4. Debunking the Federal Circuit’s Approach to the IP-CompetitionPolicy Dividing Line
Some lower court opinions, particularly those of the Federal Circuit,
could be read to hold that intellectual property rights are immune from
competition-based limits. A “patent by its very nature is anticompetitive,”
the Federal Circuit has explained, and thus “any adverse anti-competitive
effects within the scope of the . . . patent could not be redressed by antitrust
law.”295
289

Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 279–80 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 280.
291
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853–54 (2d Cir. 1997).
292
See id. at 852–53 & n.8 (noting that, for an INS claim, the defendant’s use of particular
information must place it in direct competition with the plaintiff’s product or service, and that, in many
cases, the defendant’s appropriation of that information is what places it in direct competition with the
plaintiff).
293
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231, 238, 242, 245–46.
294
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 854.
295
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added); see also id. (holding that where there are “no anti-competitive effects outside the
exclusionary zone of the patent,” there can be no antitrust violation); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a settlement for patent infringement between a
name-brand drug producer and a generic drug producer did not unlawfully restrain trade); Andrx
290
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For the purposes of assessing the role of competition policy in shaping
property rights, however, the Federal Circuit’s bark is worse than its bite.
It amounts to nothing more than a declaration that an intellectual property
right is not subject to antitrust challenges, except when it is—that is, when
the IP holder acts beyond the scope of the right. The Federal Circuit
assumes that competition policy has no role in defining that scope. But the
Supreme Court has never acquiesced to this truncated view of competition
policy, and the high court’s decisions, both old296 and new,297 suggest that
it will not do so. Even if the Supreme Court were to follow the Federal
Circuit’s view of antitrust and intellectual property, competition policy,
broadly defined, would remain an important factor in defining the scope of
property rights.
Congress has imposed competition-based regulatory programs that
have reached beyond the antitrust laws on several occasions. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, it required telephone companies to share
the last mile of telephone lines.298 In the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,299 better known as the HatchWaxman Act, Congress limited the scope of drug patent rights and thus
reduced the value of the drug companies’ intellectual property in order to
permit competitors to seek more rapid FDA approval for generic drugs.300
And in the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972,301 it
required the first applicant for EPA approval of a pesticide to provide
certain test data that was both expensive to prepare and generally protected
as a trade secret.302 Effectively imposing a mandatory licensing scheme for
this data, the Act required the first applicant to permit the EPA to use its
data to assess competitor-submitted pesticide applications so long as the
competitor fairly compensated the original applicant.303 In each case,
Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a generic drug
maker could not state a claim against the holder of a patent for a potential antitrust violation stemming
from a prior settlement against another generic drug maker).
296
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135–36 (1969) (declaring
that “there are established limits which the patentee must not exceed in employing the leverage of his
patent to control or limit the operations of the licensee”).
297
See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (holding that infringing
uses need not be enjoined in all cases).
298
47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
299
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
300
See id. § 271(e)(1) (stating that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs”);
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–07 (2005) (interpreting this provision
broadly).
301
7 U.S.C. § 136a, h (2006), declared unconstitutional by Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. v.
Ruckleshaus, 571 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm’rs Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
302
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 990–98 (1984) (describing the operation of
the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act).
303
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2006).
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304

D. Integrating Competition Policy into Right-of-Publicity Analysis
Just as competition policy shapes the scope of property rights
generally, it should set limits on the right of publicity. To date, however,
neither courts nor commentators have explored this option for limiting the
scope of publicity rights.305 This section explains how such an approach
would operate.
In most situations, the right of publicity, like other property, does not
empower its owner to supplant market forces with monopolistic dictates.
In those common cases, publicity rights should be as robust as other forms
of property normally are. But when publicity rights would enable a
celebrity to restrain competition, those rights should be narrowed just as
competition policy has led courts and legislatures to limit other property
rights.
Particularly with respect to markets populated by the fans of famous
celebrities, publicity rights will tend to create the power to restrain
competition because there will often be no reasonable substitute for a
substantial group of dedicated fans or consumers.306 Generally, in the
intellectual property realm, restraints on competition embodying the
304

See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015 (“Allowing applicants for registration, upon payment
of compensation, to use data already accumulated by others, rather than forcing them to go through the
time-consuming process of repeating the research, would eliminate a significant barrier to entry into the
pesticide market, thereby allowing greater competition among producers of end-use products.” (citing
S. REP. NO. 95-334, at 30–31, 40–41 (1977); 124 CONG. REC. 29,756–57 (1978) (remarks of Sen.
Leahy))).
305
Dogan and Lemley argue against the right of publicity on the ground that it permits celebrities
to stifle competition. See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1185–86 (describing
the right of publicity as “at base anti-market” and creating “a market distortion”). They argue that the
right restrains competition to exploit the celebrity’s identity, contradicting the broader competition
policy in favor of competition to drive producer surplus to marginal cost. Id. at 1186 & n.114; Lemley,
supra note 102, at 144. Their concerns are well directed at interference with the competitive process,
but their solutions seem misdirected. Because one might use a property right to stifle competition does
not lead to the conclusion that there should be no property right even in cases where it could not be
used to stifle competition. Competition law trumps would-be property rights, but only when they
would permit the owner to exploit market power. See supra Part VI.C. Just as many patent holders
have no market power despite the ability to restrict the use of a patented technology, most celebrities
have no market power in the markets in which their identities are used. Dogan and Lemley effectively
take the position that any departures from the norm of a competitive market require a justification. But
that position simply assumes that publicity is not property. Competition policy limits the scope of
property rights only when the needs of competition provide a justification for doing so. See Bd. of
Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether [a]
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. . . . The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant fact[or]s.”).
306
See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (noting that,
from a celebrity fan’s perspective, parodies and distortions of celebrity figures are not satisfactory
substitutes for conventional depictions of celebrities and, as a result, do not threaten markets for
celebrity memorabilia).
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property right are tolerated because they create incentives for competitors
to develop new and improved intellectual property.307 The risk and
expense of creativity, the theory goes, could lead to passivity if the law
failed to adequately protect intellectual property. Usually, therefore, the
law favors long-run competition to innovate over short-run price and
quality competition.308
By contrast, in markets geared toward the fans of popular celebrities,
strengthening publicity rights is unlikely to trigger beneficial long-run
competition to innovate.309 Those who would market pictures of John
Wayne wearing lipstick, for example, are unlikely to create a competitor to
John Wayne’s persona if they are prohibited from marketing their product.
Conversely, if publicity rights are weakened, competition to create
products using John Wayne’s persona would be invigorated. The balance
between short- and long-run competition thus tilts toward the short run in
this type of publicity rights case.
Antitrust experts may object to this approach on the ground that there
is unlikely to be a relevant antitrust market in goods relating to a particular
celebrity. As the recently proposed new merger guidelines recognize,
however, traditional notions of market definition may not accurately
identify competitive harm.310 These guidelines thus explicitly recognize
that markets should sometimes be defined with respect to “targeted
customers.”311 Where a firm “could profitably target a subset of
customers for price increases, the Agencies may identify relevant
markets defined around those targeted customers.”312 This approach is
quite relevant to publicity rights cases in which hardcore fans of a
celebrity constitute the targeted market that would be subject to
exploitation if the celebrity is permitted to use the right of publicity to
limit the sale of merchandise depicting the celebrity.
More important, in applying competition policy principles to right-ofpublicity cases, courts should not view their task as assessing whether a
307
See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1163 (“Reasoning that the right of
publicity gives individuals the incentive to develop valuable personas, courts conclude that depriving
these individuals of the fruits of their labors will interfere with those economic incentives.”).
308
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 22–23 (1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/57/1920398.pdf
(indicating that the short-run view of competition has given way to a longer-run view, though
cautioning that “competition authorities” would be unlikely to accept “every argument that a particular
transaction [deemed] anticompetitive in the short run is nonetheless justified because of its long-run
effects”).
309
More specifically, strengthening publicity rights may promote the creation of parodies and
distortions of celebrity figures rather than more conventional depictions. For fans, the former represent
less satisfactory memorabilia than the latter. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
310
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/100420hmg.pdf.
311
Id. § 4.1.4.
312
Id.
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celebrity has violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. The specific legal
doctrine applicable to antitrust cases is shaped by the concern that
weakening property rights and imposing a duty to deal may dampen the
long-run competitive instincts of dominant firms in a way that would
reduce consumer welfare.313
The Supreme Court has identified three ways in which this concern
with aggressive antitrust enforcement manifests itself. None of them apply
to the right of publicity. First, forced sharing “may lessen the incentive for
the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in” improving the existing assets
in the market.314 Restricting the right of publicity in these circumstances,
however, would be unlikely to discourage innovation by either the
celebrity or the party seeking to employ the celebrity’s identity. On the
contrary, it would likely spur competition to develop more popular
writings and paraphernalia relating to the celebrity because more
competitors could enter the market.
Second, imposing a duty to deal through an injunction would
“require[] [the] antitrust court[] to act as [a] central planner[], identifying
the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which [it
is] ill suited.”315 In publicity rights cases, however, a court can identify
when a publicity right blunts competition by simply looking for situations
in which the celebrity asserts it. And no complicated judicial oversight
would be required to remedy a violation. The court could simply enjoin
the exercise of the right of publicity in a particular context.
Third, by forcing competitors together, property sharing could
potentially “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.”316 This
concern, however, is unlikely to arise in right-of-publicity cases.
Cooperation between celebrities and those seeking to use their identity
raises little competitive concern. As long as the right of publicity cannot
stifle competition, entry into markets using the celebrity’s identity should
be quite easy. If, for example, a celebrity and a poster distributor agreed
on a supra-competitive price for a particular poster, other manufacturers
313
See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (explaining that the line between robust competition and predatory market foreclosure is a fine
one, and thus “[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations . . . [would tend to] ‘chill
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect’” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))); id. (noting that identifying troublesome conduct can
be quite difficult, because “‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are
myriad’” (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001))); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT 180 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf (“The
problem . . . is that even a small number of high-profile cross-border cases with divergent results are
likely substantially to impact (and potentially inefficiently chill) how global companies conduct their
business, and even how they design the products they bring to market.”).
314
Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407–08.
315
Id. at 408.
316
Id.
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could enter the market and offer lower-cost competitive posters.
Because limiting publicity rights would not have the same detrimental
effects on competition as limiting other property rights, competition policy
counsels in favor of limiting publicity rights to a greater extent than
antitrust law generally limits other property rights.317
E. Applying the Competition Policy Approach to Particular Types of
Publicity Rights Cases
Applying this competition-policy approach to right-of-publicity cases
would (1) validate the results in a number of controversial cases; (2)
compel a different result in a few; and (3) more effectively justify the
decisions in areas that have been relatively uncontroversial.
1. Advertising and Corporate Identification
In the advertising cases, the courts have interpreted the right of
publicity broadly.318 Under a competition policy analysis, this approach is
appropriate because denying an advertiser the use of a particular celebrity’s
identity has virtually no impact on competition in the provision of goods
and services. If Haynes cannot use Michael Jordan in its advertisements,
for example, it can hire a different celebrity or design an advertising
campaign that does not reference any celebrity’s identity. Marketplace
forces continue to govern competition in the sale of underwear, and no
celebrity has the power to dictate market conditions. The existing blanket
rule permitting celebrities to assert right-of-publicity claims when their
identity is used in advertising is thus justified under the competition-policy
approach.319
Cases in which celebrity identity is used in a company name or slogan
will also generally raise no competitive concerns. The Sixth Circuit thus
correctly upheld Johnny Carson’s right of publicity against the use of
“Here’s Johnny” to describe a line of portable toilets.320 The denial of the
317
The basis for judicially limiting publicity rights based on competition principles is beyond the
scope of this Article. The federal policy favoring competition provides a firm ground for interpreting
the right of publicity consistently with that policy. Although states may legislate in ways that conflict
with this federal policy, they may do so only when state officials actively supervise any authorized
anticompetitive conduct. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992). The exercise of
publicity rights by celebrities is not supervised by state officials, and thus any state authorization would
be insufficient to blunt federal policy.
318
See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs”).
319
The competition policy approach nevertheless does not resolve the difficult question of how
broadly to interpret celebrity identity. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a robot performing a celebrity’s role on a game show may exploit the
celebrity’s identity). But that issue is largely a question of fact. Does the advertisement in fact invoke
some aspect of the celebrity’s identity that is recognizable and entitled to protection?
320
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836–37 (1983).
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use of Carson’s signature slogan did not stifle competition. Many
competitive options were open to the defendant that would not impinge on
any celebrity’s right of publicity.321
Unlike the advertising cases, however, a blanket rule would not be
appropriate in the context of corporate names. Celebrity identity could be
so central to meaningful competition in a particular field that a right-ofpublicity claim should be excluded. For example, if a celebrity could use
publicity rights to block the performances of an impersonator, the celebrity
could significantly restrain competition from sound-alike and look-alike
performers. The impersonator cases that uphold the right of publicity
would thus come out differently under the competition-policy approach.322
Other examples of markets in which celebrity identity in a business name
may be important to competition include clubs, websites, and magazines
dedicated to providing (1) information about a celebrity, (2) paraphernalia
relating to the celebrity, and (3) forums for fans to air their views. If rightof-publicity claims could be waged against businesses providing these
services, the celebrity could restrict competition in information and goods
relating to that celebrity in ways that would negatively impact consumers.
2. Newsgathering and Biography
The courts have appropriately denied right-of-publicity claims in cases
involving the reporting of news, commentary about celebrities,323 and
biographical books and movies.324 Competition in the provision of news
about, or more complete biographical histories of, celebrities could not
meaningfully exist if news organizations, authors, and filmmakers had to
obtain a license before reporting about a celebrity.
One might argue that, even if one celebrity exercised the right of
publicity to bar reporting, news about other celebrities would still provide
enough fodder for competition to go on. But the mere process of
determining what can be reported and what cannot would seriously impact
competition. Justice Holmes famously wrote that “[g]overnment hardly
could go on” if it had to pay for every change in value to property resulting
321

Id. at 837.
See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1360–61 (D.N.J. 1981) (stating that
“good-faith imitation of a famous person . . . does not give a privilege to appropriate another’s valuable
attributes on a continuing basis,” and that allowing such activity would diminish the “commercial value
of the name or likeness of [the celebrity]”).
323
See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying a
right-of-publicity claim where a picture of Dustin Hoffman in his Tootsie costume was used in an
artistically-creative commentary on classic films and actors).
324
See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 260 N.Y.S.2d 451, 453 (App. Div. 1965) (explaining that
“certain privileged uses or exemptions” prevent a celebrity from enforcing a right-of-publicity claim,
including “matters of news, history, biography, and other factual subjects of public interest despite the
necessary references to the names, portraits, identities, or histories of living persons”), aff’d, 221
N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (per curiam).
322
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325

from regulatory activity.
The same is true of the celebrity newsreporting industry. Even if most celebrities were willing to grant licenses,
the transaction costs of obtaining them would be prohibitive.
With respect to biography, a licensing scheme would be more feasible,
but no less stifling of competition. The potential buyers of a biography
about a particular celebrity may not form a relevant market in an antitrust
sense.
From a broader competition policy perspective, however,
permitting a publicity right to block the publication of biographies would
significantly impact the ability of authors competing to publish the best
account of a particular celebrity’s life. The celebrity could selectively
license publicity rights to maximize return and control the content of
biographies, both of which run counter to competition principles.326 If
marketplace forces are to govern celebrity-related news reporting and
biography, publicity rights cannot exist in robust form. Again, current
law—essentially a blanket rule refusing to recognize a right of publicity in
news-reporting and biography cases—is appropriate.327
3. The Merchandising of Celebrity Identity
Merchandising cases have been among the most controversial right-ofpublicity decisions. The following subsections review some of the key
cases in light of the competition-policy approach to limiting the right of
publicity.
a. Fantasy Sports Leagues
The recent fantasy baseball case is instructive. Major League Baseball
(MLB) players asserted that their collective rights of publicity prevented
companies from operating fantasy baseball leagues without a license.328
325

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
See supra Part VI.A for a description of competition policy and its principles.
327
One exception may be where a media outlet reproduces so much of a celebrity’s act that it
impacts the ability of the celebrity to profitably compete. Although such situations are rare, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the right of publicity could support a damages action against a television
station that broadcast a performer’s entire human cannonball act. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1977) (“Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act
without his consent. The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to
compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege respondent to film
and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner . . . .”).
328
Fantasy baseball is a game in which fans select various players and earn points based on the
performance of those players in actual games. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
2007). The Eighth Circuit described the game as follows:
Before the commencement of the [MLB] season each spring, participants form their
fantasy baseball teams by “drafting” players from various [MLB] teams.
Participants compete against other fantasy baseball “owners” who have also drafted
their own teams. A participant’s success, and his or her team’s success, depends on
the actual performance of the fantasy team’s players on their respective actual teams
326
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Operating a league requires systems to track players’ records, calculate
statistics, and allocate the appropriate points to the participants.329
Because these tasks are labor intensive, many game players choose to
purchase these services from a company that organizes leagues.330
Historically, the MLB Players Association controlled whatever
property rights the players had in their names and records for use in fantasy
baseball games, licensing those rights to any company seeking to operate a
fantasy league.331 In 2005, however, the Players Association licensed its
rights exclusively to Advanced Media, an arm of MLB.332 This agreement
purported to grant Advanced Media alone the right to operate a fantasy
league.333 Advanced Media then refused to sub-license many companies
that had previously operated fantasy baseball businesses.334
One company that was denied a license, CDM Fantasy Sports, sued
seeking a declaratory judgment that MLB players had no enforceable
property right entitling them to block CDM’s use of the players’ names and
records in the course of providing fantasy baseball games.335 To many, the
notion that the players have any property right in their statistics appears
outlandish.336 But under Missouri law, which the Eighth Circuit was
required to apply, the players did possess a right of publicity that, on its
face, empowered them to prohibit the unlicensed operation of a fantasy
baseball league.337 The court was able to hold otherwise only by claiming
that the company organizing a fantasy league had a First Amendment right
to publish player statistics because this information was “in the public
during the course of the [MLB] season.
Id. at 820–21.
329
For more information on fantasy baseball, see Fantasy Baseball, ESPN, http://games.espn.
go.com/frontpage/baseball (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
330
C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. Fees may be charged for the basic task of maintaining the
point totals of the fantasy league participants as well as for other services, such as trading players. Id.
331
Id. The Players Association claimed a property interest in “‘the names, nicknames, likenesses,
signatures, pictures, playing records, and/or biographical data of each player.’” Id. at 1080–81.
332
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 821.
333
See id. at 821 (recognizing that the agreement contained some exclusions not relevant here);
C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (same).
334
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 821; C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081. MLB sent former licensees a ceaseand-desist letter, ordering them to stop using the names and records of MLB players. Anastasios
Kaburakis, Legal Case Brief, C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007), INT’L J. SPORT COMM., 2008, at 241, 242; Donna
Walter, St. Louis-Based Fantasy Baseball Web Site Wins in Federal Court, MO. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 14,
2006, at 2.
335
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 820; C.B.C., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–82. Advanced Media and the MLB
Players Association admitted that the players had no property rights in their records and argued that
their case rested exclusively on the use of the players’ names in conjunction with the operation of a
fantasy baseball game. Id. at 1082. The license, however, purported to include “‘playing records,
and/or biographical data of each player,’” id. at 1080–81, and, of course, mere records—numbers—
untethered to player names, would be of little use in running a fantasy league.
336
Maury Brown, Fantasy Stats and the Intellectual Property Debate, HARDBALL TIMES (Jan. 30,
2006), http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/fantasy-stats-and-the-intellectual-property-debate/.
337
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822–23.
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domain.”
The court’s analysis was illuminating in its emptiness: “[I]t
would be strange law that a person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment
right to use information that is available to everyone.”339
The Eighth Circuit’s opaque decision raises more questions than it
answers. If the factual material at issue was in the public domain, how
could baseball players simultaneously have a property right in that
material, and, assuming they had such a right vis-à-vis for-profit fantasy
league providers, as the court held that they did under Missouri law, why
should it matter from the perspective of free speech whether material is in
the public domain? At a minimum, the decision has failed to convince
some commentators.340
Applying competition-policy analysis, by contrast, confirms that the
Eighth Circuit reached the correct result. Recognizing a right of publicity
would have created substantial market power in the players, enabling them
to stifle competition in the market to provide fantasy baseball. Potential
competitors literally could not operate a league without access to player
names in conjunction with their statistics. The players’ property rights
under state law should not trump this competitive interest, because
competition policy plays a role in determining the scope of property rights.
Denying the applicability of the right in this context was essential to ensure
that marketplace forces, rather than the monopolistic dictates of the
players, continued to govern the provision of fantasy baseball leagues.
b. Painting of a Famous Golfer
Like the Eighth Circuit in the fantasy baseball case, the Sixth Circuit
followed a circuitous path in denying Tiger Woods’s assertion that his
publicity rights empowered him to block the sale of a painting celebrating
his win at the Masters Golf Tournament.341 After first holding that the
right of publicity applied, the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce it because of
the transformative nature of the painting and the artist’s speech interests.342
338

Id. at 823.
Id.
340
A number of commentators have expressed disagreement with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis.
See, e.g., Gabriel Grossman, Comment, Switch Hitting: How C.B.C. v. MLB Advanced Media
Redefined the Right of Publicity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 285, 286 (2007) (“[I]n rejecting the players’
claim that fantasy sports infringe their rights, [the district court in] C.B.C. . . . abandon[ed] prior
approaches to the right of publicity and create[d] its own.”); Havlir, supra note 142, at 253 (“Perhaps
the court simply did not want MLB to scrape another layer of revenue from the fans. . . . The First
Amendment simply does not extend so far as to offer protection to fantasy baseball.”); Gustavo A.
Otalvora, Note, Alfonso Soriano Is Getting Robbed: Why the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Made a
Bad Call in C.B.C Distribution and Marketing v. Major League Baseball, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 383, 404 (“In C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing II, the Eighth Circuit applied Missouri law,
albeit incorrectly . . . .”).
341
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) (divided panel).
342
See id. at 938 (“[W]e find that Rush’s work . . . does not capitalize solely on a literal depiction
of Woods . . . [but] [r]ather . . . consists of a collage of images in addition to Woods’s image which are
339
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Rather than enter the realm of art critics, a court applying competition
policy analysis would limit itself to determining whether artists could
meaningfully compete to sell sports paintings if athletes were free to assert
right-of-publicity claims. If golf art buyers would substitute paintings of
anyone golfing for the Woods painting, then recognizing a famous golfer’s
publicity rights would not stifle competition. A painter could compete by
painting fictional golfers. If, instead, a substantial number of consumers
would only be interested in paintings featuring Tiger Woods, then Woods
could distort competition by exercising a right of publicity to block the sale
of particular paintings.
In antitrust cases, a relevant product market is typically defined by
asking whether most consumers would switch to another product in
response to a “small but significant and nontransitory” price increase.343
Given Woods’s popularity at that time, most consumers of paintings
featuring him would be unlikely to switch to paintings of other golfers in
response to a modest price increase. A court following the competitionpolicy approach would thus have reached the same result as the Sixth
Circuit.
c. Inexpensive Celebrity Paraphernalia
Among the most controversial cases are those involving relatively
inexpensive clothing and trinkets.344 Courts upheld right-of-publicity
claims in cases involving a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges on a Tshirt345 and a bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.,346 on the ground that these
inexpensive items did not constitute sufficiently transformative works of
art to trigger First Amendment protection.347 Under competition-policy
analysis, a court would instead look to whether dealers in these types of
goods could meaningfully compete if their subjects could assert publicity
rights.
In the circumstances of these two cases, the outcome would likely have
been different under competition-policy analysis. The Stooges are an
combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports history and to convey a message about
the significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.”).
343
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.11
(1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/11.html (internal quotation marks
omitted).
344
See Dogan & Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1175–76 (describing merchandising
cases under the right of publicity as “particularly troubling”).
345
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 800, 811 (Cal. 2001).
346
Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d
697, 698, 706 (Ga. 1982).
347
Both of these cases also involved the controversial question of whether publicity rights should
be descendible. That issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but others have given it insightful
treatment. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 87–
89 (2008) (“The question here is how heirs’ interests relate to preservation or why they may desire
preservation of the artifacts.”).
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iconic comedy team with many devoted fans, and King is a beloved
historical figure. In both cases, there are likely to be many consumers who
would not accept as ready substitutes alternative paraphernalia that did not
evoke the identity of the particular celebrity in question. Items involving
lesser celebrities, by contrast, might have reasonable substitutes. Although
competition-policy analysis may be challenging for courts in some
merchandising cases, determining whether reasonable substitutes exist for
particular products in the eyes of devoted fans is much closer to the core
judicial function than attempting to assess the transformative value of
works of art.348
VII. CONCLUSION
The broad-based challenge to the right of publicity has made little
headway since Michael Madow so forcefully presented it fifteen years ago.
The critique’s failure is attributable in large part to its inability to
distinguish publicity from other forms of property.
One cannot
demonstrate that the right of publicity is an invalid property right by
accusing it of the same mischief that all forms of property make.
The free speech approach to narrowing the right of publicity, although
more successful in the courts, provides an inadequate basis on which to
restrict publicity rights. True property rights empower their owners to
prohibit speech that uses the owner’s property. Free speech analysis thus
begs the ultimate question as to whether the right of publicity is a valid
property right. If not, speech interests trump the celebrity’s interests. But
if publicity is property, then the speech interests of exploiters of celebrity
identity are irrelevant.
Competition policy, by contrast, can sensibly regulate the scope of the
right of publicity. Competition, to a large extent, dictates property’s end.
All forms of property are thus limited where they stifle marketplace forces
and replace them with entrenched monopolistic ordering. And in some
cases, publicity rights may be particularly likely to restrain competition.
Assuming that the right of publicity is a valid property right, it should be
subject to the same form of regulation as other property rights.
Although ultimately unsatisfying to those who would like to turn back
the clock and eliminate the right of publicity entirely, the pragmatic
approach advanced here may be the best means to convince courts and
legislatures to restrict the scope of publicity rights. At least, that is, until
legal theorists engage the challenging task of fully exploring the essence of
the concept of property in American law and society
348
Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 615, 641 (2000) (“The prominence of the rule of reason . . . reflects a gradual consensus within
the judiciary and also the academy that, when it comes to analyzing market structure, courts can be
trusted with at least some degree of discretion.”).

